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INTRODUCTION
Today, one in thirty-one working-age adults will have contact2
with the criminal justice system.3 African-Americans and Hispanics
are arrested at rates two to three times their proportion of the general
population,4 and minority males are nearly three to six times more
likely than their white counterparts to go to prison during their
lifetime.5 What’s more, inquiries into a job applicant’s criminal
history are increasingly universal; nearly three-quarters of
2. For the purposes of the Enforcement Guidance 915.002, references to “contact” with the criminal
justice system include arrest, charge, indictment, citation, conviction, incarceration, probation, or parole.
U.S. EEOC, NOTICE 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND
CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 3, 27 n.3 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Guidance], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/
arrest_conviction.cfm.
3. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 5 (2009),
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_
WEB_3-26-09.pdf.
4. Uniform Crime Reports, Arrests by Race, 2010, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/table43/10tbl43a.xls (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter 2010 ARRESTS BY RACE]. As the 2012
Guidance notes, comprehensive arrest and conviction data for Hispanics is severely limited. 2012
GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 8 & n.67. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting
Program will not track or provide arrest rates for Hispanics, nationally or regionally, until 2013. FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, SUMMARY OF
THE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) PROGRAM 6 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/about-ucr. According to the most recent Drug
Enforcement Agency Defendant Statistical System data available, however, approximately 49% of
suspects arrested for drug offenses alone were Hispanic or Latino even though during the same year this
demographic represented only 16.3% of the country’s population. KAREN R. HUMES, NICHOLAS A.
JONES & ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010 4 tbl.1 (2011),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf; MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2010 9–10 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fjs10.pdf.
5. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S.
POPULATION, 1974–2001 1, 5 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
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employment applications elicit self-reporting of prior criminal
behavior,6 and the same percentage of employers routinely conduct
criminal background checks on all candidates.7
In light of a pointed Third Circuit decision and long-overdue
recognition that the Internet and Fair Credit Reporting Act8 have
fundamentally changed the game in terms of access to personal
information, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission) recently voted to enact new enforcement
guidance regulating employers’ use of criminal history information.9
6. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 953, 955 (2003).
7. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/
Pages/BackgroundCheckCriminalChecks.aspx. Ninety-two percent of 347 responding employers stated
that they subjected all or some of their job candidates to criminal background checks while seventythree percent of respondents confirmed checking all applicants’ backgrounds. Id.
8. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). The Act defines “‘consumer
report’” to mean “any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit[,] . . . character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or
mode of living which is used . . . for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s
eligibility for . . . employment purposes; . . . .” Id. § 1681a(d)(1) (emphasis added). Criminal background
checks fall within these parameters, subject to several procedural safeguards. E.g., id. § 1681c(a)(5)
(excluding arrests that did not result in conviction if the arrests occurred more than seven years ago, but
permitting convictions to be reported indefinitely); id. §§ 1681d(d)(3), 1681k (requiring notice to the
consumer when a report furnished to an employer contains matters of public record likely to affect
adversely that consumer’s ability to obtain employment, and mandating that reporting agencies ensure
the public record is up to date); contra id. § 1681c(b)(3) (reporting restrictions for arrests do not apply to
individuals who earn a salary equal to $75,000 or more).
9. Press Release, U.S. EEOC, EEOC Issues Enforcement Guidance (Apr. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-25-12.cfm. In El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit
Authority, the Third Circuit was highly critical of the Commission’s findings and the content of its 1987
policy statements addressing employers’ use of conviction records to exclude potential employees, and
thus was unwilling to extend much deference. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 244–
45, 248 (3d Cir. 2007); see also discussion infra Part I.B.2.
Unlike Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes, enforcement guidance promulgated by the EEOC
is not binding legal authority. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Also unlike agency regulations subject to the rigors of the notice and comment
rulemaking provisions of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that earn the highest level of
judicial deference under Chevron, the EEOC’s interpretation of a statute it administers contained in
opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines is only “‘entitled to
respect,’” and then “only to the extent that [the] interpretation[] ha[s] the ‘power to persuade.’”
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–88 (2000) (citing inter alia Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50,
61 (1995)); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Chevron thus applies to reasonable agency interpretations of an ambiguous statute contained in a
regulation or to reasonable agency interpretations of its own ambiguous regulation, neither of which is
the case here. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. The lack of
deference is a theme with which the EEOC is begrudgingly familiar. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 256–58 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
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Despite twenty years having passed since the EEOC last visited the
subject, April 2012’s Enforcement Guidance 915.002 (the Guidance)
largely reiterates old themes by emphasizing the employer’s burden
to prove that its adverse use of criminal history is “job related” and
“consistent with business necessity.”10 The Guidance goes on to
affirmatively assert that blanket policies against hiring former
offenders are infirm—despite indication otherwise from a federal
court of appeals.11 And though purporting to streamline litigation, the
agency’s proffered pathways to avoid Title VII liability give pause to
large- and small-scale employers alike: produce statistical data to
“validate” employment tests or create “targeted screens” combined
with an individualized assessment to ascertain the truth behind any
given black mark.12 According to the EEOC, only underlying facts or
conduct—not necessarily the fact of arrest or conviction itself—are
relevant for employment purposes.13
§ 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077, as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006);
El, 479 F.3d at 244; 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that judges are conspicuously absent
from the list of intended users). However, all EEOC offices adhere to the relevant enforcement
guidelines when investigating and administering discrimination charges, and courts may consider such
documents as persuasive authority. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 3.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see also 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at
10–20; discussion infra Part I.C.2.
11. El, 479 F.3d at 245; 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 16, 25. El urged the Third Circuit to hold
that Title VII “prohibits any bright-line policy with regard to criminal convictions” and affirmatively
requires that each applicant’s circumstances be considered individually. El, 479 F.3d at 245. The court
declined to go so far, indicating that bright line policies that accurately distinguish between individual
applicants’ level of risk are consistent with business necessity, and pointed to Lanning v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority for support. Id. at 245 & n.14 (citing Lanning v Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth. (Lanning II), 308 F.3d 286, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming SEPTA’s use of a bright line
aerobic capacity test to bar applicants from employment as transit police officers)).
12. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 14–18; see infra Part I.C.2 and text accompanying notes 84
and 86 for definitions of the terms “validate” and “targeted screens.” Employment testing is the practice
of administering written, oral, or other tests as a means to determine the suitability or desirability of a
job applicant and to narrow large applicant pools cost-effectively. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT.,
ASSESSMENT DECISION GUIDE 3 (2007), available at http://apps.opm.gov/ADT/ContentFiles/
AssessmentDecisionGuide071807.pdf. Cognitive and physical ability tests, language proficiency tests,
medical inquiries, personality and integrity tests, and credit checks are common examples. U.S. EEOC,
EMPLOYMENT TESTS AND SELECTION PROCEDURES FACT SHEET (Sept. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html. Regardless of form, the Court has
found that “disparate impact analysis is . . . no less applicable to subjective employment criteria than to
objective or standardized tests.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988)
(plurality opinion).
13. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 12–14.
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The EEOC is not authorized to regulate what is merely unfair, only
what is discriminatory.14 Though Title VII extended the prohibition
against discrimination in new directions, it does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of criminal history per se.15 Thus, this
Note considers whether the EEOC’s prohibition on using an
individual’s criminal history as a proxy for qualification is a valid
interpretation of Title VII and, if so, whether the new Guidance goes
far enough to establish meaningful protections for “victim”
employees, especially in light of the EEOC’s limited influence
outside its own adjudicative sphere.16
Part I of this Note introduces the relevant principles of Title VII
disparate impact analysis, the primary focus of the new Guidance.17
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2006) (“The Commission is empowered . . . to prevent any person from
engaging in any unlawful employment practice . . . .” (emphasis added)). Like the theory of disparate
impact, the EEOC’s enforcement role developed over time. Title VII did not empower the EEOC to sue
employers to enforce the Act, limiting the agency to “methods of conciliation and persuasion.”
Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358 (1977). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEO Act of 1972) established an “integrated, multistep enforcement
procedure culminating in the EEOC’s authority to bring a civil action in a federal court.” Id. at 359; see
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 186 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended
in scattered subsections at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e); see also Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 848–61
(1976) (detailing the legislative debates, proposals, and committee reports which preceded the
enactment of the EEO Act of 1972 in consideration of whether the Commission or the courts should be
given primary adjudicative responsibility for Title VII and the extent of that responsibility). Importantly,
“the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties,”
and federal courts retain the principal authority to interpret the meaning of Title VII. Occidental, 432
U.S. at 368; 118 CONG. REC. S7166 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972) (statement of Sen. Williams) (“In any area
where the new law does not address itself, . . . it was assumed that the present case law as developed by
the courts would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII.”).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (listing race, color, religion, sex, and national origin as the bases
of Title VII discrimination actions); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La.
1971) (“No federal statute prohibits discrimination per se; rather, what is prohibited is discrimination
that is racially motivated.”), aff’d mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972). Title VII’s provisions touched a
wide range of private businesses and employers formerly beyond the reach of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and included sex among the protected classes, which at that time was not recognized on a
constitutional level outside of voting. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 6–7 (2d ed. 2007). Nevertheless, employing former offenders or addressing recidivism at-large is
arguably not within the EEOC’s statutory authority. See supra note 14; see also Connor & White, infra
note 91, at 1001.
16. See supra text accompanying note 9.
17. See discussion infra Part I.A. Disparate treatment is beyond the focus of this Note, but “[o]f
course, it is [also] unlawful to disqualify a person of one race for having a conviction or arrest record
while not disqualifying a person of another race with a similar record.” U.S. EEOC, NOTICE 915.003,
COMPLIANCE MANUAL 29 (2006) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE MANUAL], available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf. Though the new Guidance dedicates only two pages to
disparate treatment analysis, a 2003 study suggests this is a significant problem. Pager, supra note 6, at
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This section also explores the seminal decisions shaping the
Guidance’s policies and briefly analyzes its narrow “safe harbor”
provision, the “duty” of Individualized Assessment (IA).18 Part II
analyzes the strength of the Guidance from three distinct
perspectives—legislative, administrative, and through the lens of the
federal judiciary—in an attempt to shed light on the EEOC’s method
and intent.19 Finally, Part III proposes a solution to reconcile the
Guidance with leading Title VII precedent and to foster
predictability.20 Former offenders may be able to find work when
labor demands accelerate in a strong economy, but those individuals’
rights—and employers’ human resources challenges—should not
become relevant concerns only in the midst of recession.21
I. BACK TO BASICS: UNPACKING DISPARATE IMPACT AND HOW THE
GUIDANCE CAME TO BE
A. First Principles: Title VII and the Griggs Progeny
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a landmark piece of
legislation, expanding the protections offered by the Constitution and
outlawing nearly every major form of discrimination against racial,
ethnic, national, and religious minorities and women in the
workplace.22 The Act’s principal nondiscrimination provisions,
however, did not include an express prohibition on policies or
947, 955–62 (audit sending matched pairs of black and white male college students to apply for 350
low-skilled jobs in Milwaukee to test the degree to which a criminal record affects subsequent
employment opportunities).
18. See discussion infra Part I.B & C. The EEOC concedes that the second proposed “safe harbor”
provision, an empirical showing that convictions or arrests are linked to future behaviors, traits, or
conduct with workplace ramifications, is rarely possible. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 15; see also
discussion infra Part II.B.
19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for
Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 22
(2005).
22. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)-(d), 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(d) (2006)). Title VII as enacted played a role in defining virtually
every aspect of the employer-employee relationship: hiring, discharge, compensation, fringe benefits,
and conditions of work. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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practices that produce disproportionate harm to a particular group.23
But in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,24 the Supreme Court found that
requiring a high school diploma or the ability to pass standardized
intelligence tests as conditions of employment operated to disqualify
blacks at a substantially higher rate than whites.25 Thus interpreting
Title VII to also prohibit employers’ facially neutral practices that are
discriminatory in operation, the Court pronounced “[G]ood intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures . . . that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”26 Instituted on
the company’s judgment that such tests would improve the overall
quality of the work force generally, neither requirement was shown
to bear any demonstrable relationship to successful performance of
the jobs for which it was used—desirable “inside” positions in the
operations, maintenance, and laboratory departments at a steam
plant.27 This lack of “business necessity,” therefore, would be the
“touchstone” for disparate impact liability, and employers would bear
the burden to prove that any qualification or test had a “manifest
relationship to the employment in question.”28
Several decisions post-Griggs elaborated on the disparate impact
theory and business necessity, but left the elements of the plaintiff’s
case (and the defendant’s rebuttal) uncertain.29 One group of
decisions was consistent with the guidelines adopted by the EEOC,
imposing exacting testing and validation requirements on defendants

23. Section 2000e-2(a) retains its original wording: it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual” or “to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
25. Id. at 425–26, 436.
26. Id. at 431–32.
27. Id. at 427, 431.
28. Id. at 431–32.
29. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (plurality opinion);
N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329–33 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249–52 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425–36 (1975).
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in order to justify their practices.30 The other group imposed less
stringent requirements upon the employer than the EEOC, generally
favoring a narrower interpretation of the theory.31 In 1989, the
Supreme Court resolved these uncertainties in favor of defendants in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, holding that a challenged
practice must merely “serve[ ], in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer” and that cost saving could be a
relevant consideration.32 Moreover, the Court clarified that, to the
extent its precedent spoke of an employer’s “burden of proof” with
respect to the business necessity defense, it should have been
understood only to mean “burden of production.”33 Only two years
later, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the prohibition on
disparate impact discrimination, abrogating with force the Court’s
attempt to clarify the doctrine in Wards Cove.34 By expressly
restoring the concepts of business necessity as enunciated in Griggs
and earlier precedent—including realignment of the burdens of proof
and persuasion—Congress expanded the scope of Title VII “in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”35
Congress further cabined the courts’ worldview by naming one
memorandum as the sole source of legislative history available to
interpret the contours of the business necessity defense.36

30. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329–33; Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425–36.
31. See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 999; Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 & n.31; Davis, 426 U.S. at 249–52.
32. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659, 661 (1989) (“[T]here is no requirement
that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business for it to pass
muster: this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to meet, and would
result in a host of evils . . . .”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
33. Id. at 660.
34. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (defining “demonstrate” to
mean “meets the burdens of production and persuasion” (emphasis added)).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1991 §§ 3(2), (4), 105(a); 137 CONG. REC. S28680 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Danforth). The new Act also provided for the right to a trial by jury and introduced
the possibility of compensatory damages in cases of intentional discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1991
§ 102 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(b).
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B. The Federal Courts’ Take on Criminal History
1. On the Heels of Change: Gregory, Green and the Golden Age
Dramatic shifts in how disparate impact plaintiffs have fared in the
federal court system play a significant role in understanding the
agency’s revamped enforcement strategy.37 In Gregory v. Litton
Systems, Inc.,38 a California district court was one of the earliest to
apply disparate impact analysis to employer policies prohibiting the
hiring of applicants with criminal arrests.39 After initially offering a
black applicant a position as a mechanic, the company later
determined through the applicant’s own candid disclosures that he
had been arrested fourteen times, and accordingly rescinded the
offer.40 Even though the plaintiff provided only general data on
national arrest rates, the court was convinced that termination based
on an arrest record had a disparate impact on black applicants.41
37. Under the statute, suits generally proceed in three phases. A plaintiff first establishes a prima
facie violation by showing that an employer uses a particular employment practice that has adverse
impact on members of a protected group, usually through statistics. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see
Watson, 487 U.S. at 987, 992 (noting that there is an “inevitable focus on statistics” and “on competing
explanations for [statistical] disparities” in disparate impact cases). An employer may defend by
demonstrating that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a
plaintiff may offer additional evidence of the employer’s refusal to adopt an available alternative
employment practice with less impact that continues to serve the employer’s legitimate needs. Id.
§§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C). The enforcement scheme likewise advances in three stages. Litigants must
first exhaust state or local administrative proceedings before pursuing investigation and conciliation by
the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(c). If the Commission is unable to secure a conciliation agreement, it may
bring a civil action or refer the case to the Attorney General. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) Only when those
specific third party efforts fail or are waived may an individual plaintiff be granted a private right to sue
in district court. Id. Given individual plaintiffs’ lack of success overcoming these evidentiary hurdles
after Green, see infra Part I.B.II, the EEOC has transitioned its focus to “big” cases to expand the scope
of relief—those with systematic discrimination among classes of plaintiffs in large industries, defined
infra note 132.
38. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal 1970), aff’d and vacated in part on
other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
39. In Litton, the employer’s policy prohibited hiring applicants “who have been arrested ‘on a
number of occasions’ for things other than minor traffic offenses.” Id. at 402. Despite this policy, the
court noted that Litton had, in practice, employed persons with prior arrests—several hundreds in fact.
Id.
40. Id. Thirteen of Gregory’s fourteen arrests occurred before 1959, roughly a decade before his
application. Id.
41. Id. at 403. Consistent with federal courts’ tendency to enable plaintiffs to establish prima facie
cases without extensive statistical evidence in the 1970s, the Litton court, in conclusory fashion,
proclaimed, “Negroes are arrested substantially more frequently than whites in proportion to their
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Litton’s “inherent[ly]” discriminatory policy could not be justified by
business necessity because the company produced no evidence that
individuals who were arrested but not convicted of a crime would
perform their jobs “less efficiently or less honestly.”42 Nonetheless,
the Litton court expressly limited its ruling to policies on arrests,
stating that “[n]othing . . . shall prohibit the Defendant from seeking,
ascertaining, considering, or using information concerning criminal
convictions of applicants or existing employees.”43
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Green v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company (MoPac) addressed conviction records, but under
a different microscope.44 Buck Green, an African-American applicant
for a corporate clerk position, disclosed that he was convicted in
1967 of refusing military induction.45 The Green court carefully
examined the company’s applicant flow data46 and rebuffed the
company’s generic justifications claiming business necessity for lack
of empirical validation.47 Finding MoPac’s blanket no-hire rule
numbers. The evidence on this question was overwhelming and utterly convincing.” Id. Alexandra
Harwin notes that “[s]ome courts during this period . . . required more refined statistical evidence,
[often] resulting in considerably less favorable outcomes for plaintiffs.” Alexandra Harwin, Title VII
Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY
J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 7 (2012). For cases reflecting this heightened burden, see, for example, Hill
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283, 1302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding plaintiff’s failure to produce
applicant flow data fatal), Powell v. Nat’l Distillers Prods. Co., No. C-1-76-186, 1980 WL 84, at *13
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 1980) (“The biggest problem surrounding the use of statistics is that the wrong group,
or ‘universe,’ may be selected for comparison. . . . If the universe selected is overly inclusive, the
comparison cannot reflect the actual impact of a defendant’s actions.”), and Reynolds v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 973–74 (D.D.C. 1980) (noting that applicant flow data fails to
capture the “chilling” effect of criminal record inquiries).
42. Litton, 316 F. Supp. at 402. Though the trial court deemed the discrimination “inherent,” on
appeal the Ninth Circuit clarified that “Litton obviously intended to use the questionnaire. But there
[was] no evidence of a purpose to disadvantage black applicants, nor . . . [intent] to persist in the
discrimination after it was identified.” Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 633 n.3 (9th Cir.
1972).
43. Litton, 316 F. Supp. at 404.
44. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 1292.
46. See id. at 1294–96. Applicant flow data compares the racial composition of the employer’s
current employees to its applicant pool, representing the yield of recruitment efforts. Harwin, supra note
41, at 7. During the period from September 1, 1971, through November 7, 1973, 3,282 blacks and 5,206
whites applied for employment with MoPac. Green, 523 F.2d at 1294. Of these applicants, MoPac
rejected 174 blacks and 118 whites because of their conviction records. Id. Thus, the court concluded
“the policy operated automatically to exclude from employment 53 of every 1,000 black applicants but
only 22 of every 1,000 white applicants.” Id. at 1294–95.
47. Green, 523 F.2d at 1298. MoPac offered seven reasons why its policy was a business necessity:
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violated Title VII, the court held that a policy “deny[ing] job
opportunities . . . because of some conduct which may be remote in
time or does not significantly bear upon the particular job
requirements” is “unnecessarily harsh and unjust.”48 The court boldly
pronounced, “We cannot conceive of any business necessity that
would automatically place every individual convicted of any
offense . . . in the permanent ranks of the unemployed.”49 On remand,
the district court identified three factors that an employer could use to
determine whether an applicant’s prior convictions should be
considered in a hiring decision: (1) the nature and gravity of the
offense(s); (2) the time elapsed since the conviction or completion of
sentence; and (3) the nature of the job for which the applicant
applied.50 Though Green’s balancing test emerged as the standard,
contemporaneous district level decisions added to the discourse,
demonstrating the rigorous standard of review applied against
employers in disparate impact’s heyday.51
2. The New Era: Dimming Prospects
The tide of exacting judicial scrutiny of the 1970s did not last.52
From 1983 through 2002, only about one-quarter of disparate impact
“1) fear of cargo theft, 2) handling company funds, 3) bonding qualifications, 4) possible impeachment
of an employee as a witness, 5) possible liability for hiring persons with known violent tendencies, 6)
employment disruption caused by recidivism, and 7) alleged lack of moral character of persons with
convictions.” Id. Concluding its analysis of these justifications, the court instructed, “Although the
reasons MoPac advances for its absolute bar can serve as relevant considerations in making individual
hiring decisions, they in no way justify an absolute policy which sweeps so broadly.” Id. It did not help
MoPac’s case that its own expert witness conceded that not every former offender will be a poor
employee, and that it would be preferable for the company to consider such offenders on an individual
basis. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977).
51. Harwin emphasizes that many of the early disparate impact claims succeeded—regardless of the
quality of the statistics or concrete justifications presented—because the discrimination alleged was
overt. Harwin, supra note 41, at 6. In less obvious cases, the court employed a more exacting scrutiny.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971) (concluding
convictions for theft and receipt of stolen goods were sufficiently job-related to justify refusing
employment to a black applicant seeking work as a bellman after closely scrutinizing whether the
position actually provided easy access to guests’ rooms and valuables instead of merely accepting
defendant’s claim that position was “‘security sensitive’”), aff’d mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
52. The late 1980s and early 1990s bore a paradigm shift. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver

Published by Reading Room, 2013

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 6

602

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

cases succeeded in federal district courts.53 Exemplifying this change
in outlook is El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA), where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
an employer’s application of a policy against hiring individuals with
violent criminal convictions—sparking the EEOC to publish new
guidance.54 In El, King Paratransit Services, Inc. (King) conditionally
hired Douglas El to drive buses serving disabled citizens in
metropolitan Philadelphia.55 King was required to ensure that no
SEPTA driver have any previous conviction for a crime of violence,
“moral turpitude,” or driving under the influence.56 A background
check revealed El’s forty-seven year-old conviction for second-

Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (finding “employee
morale” warranted termination of an employee with a thirty-year-old rape conviction); Williams v.
Scott, No. 92 C 5747, 1992 WL 229849, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992) (suggesting that “[i]t really
requires nothing more than the statement of [employer’s] policy to explain its business justification” and
thus finding “minimizing the perceived risk of employee dishonesty” justified a felony conviction
exclusion (emphasis added)); Tye v. City of Cincinnati, 794 F. Supp. 824, 833 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (citing
the “potential risk to public safety” as sufficient justification for exclusion); EEOC v. Carolina Freight
Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 752–54 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (finding it sufficient that “management
believes its conviction policy is both effective and integral” and noting that “[i]f Hispanics do not wish
to be discriminated against because they have been convicted of theft then, they should stop stealing”).
53. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 739 tbl.B
(2006). Harwin’s updated research also indicates that judgments have been “uniformly grim” for
plaintiffs alleging that the consideration of criminal records disparately impacts African-American or
Hispanic job applicants. Harwin, supra note 41, at 12. Since the late 1980s, in no case identified did a
plaintiff win after a trial on the merits, and rarely did a plaintiff survive a summary judgment motion. Id.
at 12 & n.59. But see, e.g., Caston v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (C.D. Ill.
2002) (surviving motion to dismiss); McCraven v. City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 877, 881, 883 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss on Title VII disparate treatment and § 1983 claims). These results
explain, in part, the EEOC’s favorable presumption of disparate impact, relieving plaintiffs of all legal
and financial burdens of developing statistical proof. On a substantive level, in the 2009 case of Ricci v.
DeStefano, Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which he called upon the Court to confront the
“evil day” when it would have to reconcile the disparate impact provisions of Title VII with the Equal
Protection Clause, further suggesting that disparate impact may be on shaky legal footing. Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
54. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 248 (3d Cir. 2007). The Commission viewed
the El decision as a clear instruction that it “should provide in-depth legal analysis and updated research
on this issue.” Questions and Answers About the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration
of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, U.S. EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/qa_arrest_conviction.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) [hereinafter
Guidance Q&A].
55. El, 479 F.3d at 235.
56. Id. at 236.
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degree murder at age fifteen stemming from a gang fight.57 It was
El’s only serious offense and the sole reason for his rejection.58
In upholding SEPTA’s application of its no-hire rule on summary
judgment, the court emphasized that Title VII requires accuracy, not
perfection.59 Despite SEPTA’s “apparent loose manner” in
formulating and defending its policy, it nonetheless produced
credible expert testimony that the policy accurately screened out
applicants “likely” to commit acts of violence against its vulnerable
passengers.60 The El court stressed practicality: “hiring
policies . . . ultimately concern the management of risk,”61 and
accordingly, record-based bright line rules are not per se unlawful,
contrary to earlier precedent.62 Based on the nature of the job El
sought and his failure to provide any expert testimony to rebut his
employer’s claims, SEPTA sufficiently demonstrated that its policy
“[accurately] distinguish[ed] between individual applicants [who] do
and do not pose an unacceptable level of risk.”63
The El court also laid new hurdles before the EEOC. The court
explicitly discredited the Commission’s determination that El would
not pose a threat due to the relevance of his youth and remoteness of
the conviction, suggesting that such conclusions were “terse” and
57. Id. at 235–36.
58. Id. at 236.
59. Id. at 244–45. It is important to understand that the court was keenly aware of the case of
paratransit driver David deSouza, who attacked and raped a passenger while serving as a SEPTA driver
but at the time of hire had no prior convictions. Id. at 244 n.12.
60. Id. at 248. How “likely” is too likely or unlikely is a significant issue that remains largely
unaddressed, even in the new Guidance. In El, neither the court nor the expert defined the recidivism
risk for El in the position in question or whether each individual employer is able to make its own value
judgment by subjectively establishing “likelihood” levels suitable for his or her business. Id. at 245–46;
see also George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination,
73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298, 1310 (1987) [hereinafter Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory] (suggesting
that disparate impact theory’s objective approach, evident in the consistent emphasis on empirical
evidence to measure effects, deems employer (or customer preference) not controlling); infra text
accompanying note 106. SEPTA merely submitted that it presented sufficient evidence that a reasonable
jury could find that “someone with a conviction for a violent crime is more likely than someone without
one to commit a future violent crime irrespective of how remote [the] time [since] conviction.” El, 479
F.3d at 245. The court rather summarily agreed, at least as applied to a person with a violent criminal
conviction like El. Id. at 245–46.
61. El, 479 F.3d at 244.
62. Id. at 245. See infra note 69 for a list of decisions precluding employers’ use of blanket
exclusionary policies.
63. El, 479 F.3d at 245, 247, 248.
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“without explanation, analysis, or authority.”64 It went on to question
the usefulness of the EEOC’s guidelines, stating that they “do not
speak to whether an employer can take [the business necessity]
factors into account when crafting a bright-line policy” or deciding
whether certain offenses are “serious enough to warrant a lifetime
ban.”65 The court concluded its criticisms by noting that the
guidelines did not appear to be “entitled to great deference” under
United States v. Skidmore.66 Though the EEOC explicitly aligned its
policy with Green in 1987, the guidelines themselves did not
substantively analyze the requirements of Title VII nor bolster their
assertions with scientific underpinnings.67
C. Late to the Party? The EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance, Then
and Now
1. Sound the Alarm: Green’s Call to Action
Ten years after Green’s final appeal, the EEOC issued its first
formal policy statements adopting its interpretation of the Green
case.68 Consistent with the weight of judicial authority pre-El,69 the
64. Id. at 248. Though the EEOC initially found in El’s favor, it was unable to resolve the dispute in
conciliation. Id. at 237. The agency’s findings, therefore, were admissible only as relevant substantive
evidence. Id. at 248 n.19.
65. Id. at 243.
66. Id. at 244. Under Skidmore, administrative guidelines earn deference only “in accordance with
the thoroughness of [the] research and the persuasiveness of [the] reasoning” underlying them. Id.
(citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)); see also supra note 9.
67. El, 479 F.3d at 244.
68. U.S. EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE USE OF STATISTICS IN CHARGES INVOLVING THE
EXCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH CONVICTION RECORDS FROM EMPLOYMENT (1987) [hereinafter 1987
STATISTICS GUIDANCE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict2.html (explaining crime
specific versus non-crime specific policies); U.S. EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF
CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1987) [hereinafter 1987
CONVICTION GUIDANCE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html. Although the
guidance was not formally issued until 1987, the EEOC had at least a decade of experience applying
similar precedent to disparate impact claims brought by Blacks and Hispanics. See, e.g., EEOC Decision
No. 78-35, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1755 (1978) (concluding that an employee’s discharge was
reasonable given his pattern of criminal behavior and the severity and recentness of his criminal
conduct); EEOC Decision No. 74-89, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 431 (1974) (challenging a policy
where a felony conviction was considered an adverse factor that would lead to disqualification); EEOC
Decision No. 72-1497, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 849 (1972) (challenging a criminal record
exclusion policy based on “serious crimes”); EEOC Decision No. 70-43, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
169 (1969) (concluding that an employee’s discharge due to the falsification of his arrest record in his
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1987 statements indicated that an absolute bar to employment based
on the mere fact that an individual has a conviction record is
unlawful under Title VII.70 Instead, employers could only review
conviction information if justified by business necessity based on the
Green factors, simplifying the analysis by eliminating consideration
of an individual’s employment history and efforts at rehabilitation as
prescribed in earlier Commission decisions.71 The EEOC issued a
third policy guideline in 1990.72 This time acknowledging Litton as
its guide, the EEOC set forth that unlike convictions, “arrests alone
are not reliable evidence that a person has actually committed a
crime.”73 Therefore, in order to establish business necessity to rely on
employment application did not violate Title VII).
69. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,
326 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding that a conviction record may not be an absolute bar to employment as a
firefighter under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983), reh’g granted, 1971 WL 10776 (Dec. 2, 1971);
Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff’d mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1972); see also Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Craig v. Dep’t of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 508 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Cross v. U.S. Postal Serv., 483 F. Supp. 1050
(E.D. Mo. 1979), rev’d, 639 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1981). The weight of judicial authority also reflects,
however, that the courts most frequently invalidate record-based bans in public employment under the
notion that the government is, or should be, a “model employer.” See Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717(a), 86 Stat. 103, 111 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(a) (2006)) (“All personnel actions affecting [federal] employees or applicants for
employment . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501, 87 Stat. 355, 390 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791) (mandating federal agencies submit to the EEOC for approval an annually
updated “affirmative action program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped
individuals”).
70. 1987 STATISTICS GUIDANCE, supra note 68. The 1987 STATISTICS GUIDANCE differs from its
counterpart CONVICTION GUIDANCE in that it decreases the emphasis on the presumption of disparate
impact, qualifying that “when [an] employer can present more narrowly drawn statistics showing either
that Blacks and Hispanics are not convicted at a disproportionately greater rate or that there is no
adverse impact in its own hiring process resulting from the convictions policy, then a no cause
determination would be appropriate.” Id. (emphasis added). To compare this policy with employers’
approach for rebutting disparate impact in the 2012 Guidance, see infra note 81.
71. 1987 CONVICTION GUIDANCE, supra note 68.
72. U.S. EEOC, NOTICE 915.061, POLICY GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST RECORDS
IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1990) [hereinafter
1990 ARREST GUIDANCE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/arrest_records.html. Like
earlier conviction policies, the 1990 ARREST GUIDANCE emphasized reliance on statistics: “It is
desirable to use the most current available statistics. In addition, where local statistics are available, it
may be helpful to use them.” Id. Underscoring the naivety of the EEOC (and perhaps the nation), the
1990 ARREST GUIDANCE noted that “[t]he Commission has determined that Hispanics are also adversely
affected by arrest record inquiries.” Id.
73. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the EEOC discussed the difference between conviction and arrest
records. “Conviction records constitute reliable evidence that a person engaged in the conduct alleged
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such records, an employer must not only apply Green, but must also
“evaluate whether the arrest record reflects the applicant’s
conduct.”74 The 1990 Guidance remained largely untouched by the
Commission even after Congress’s codification of disparate impact in
1991.75
2. Rising from El’s Ashes: April 2012’s Enforcement76 Guidance
915.002
In recent years, the EEOC and the nation as a whole increased
their focus on reintegration efforts and employer use of criminal
history information.77 On July 26, 2011, the full Commission held a
since the criminal justice system requires the highest degree of proof (‘beyond a reasonable doubt’) for a
conviction.” Id. By contrast, “‘[t]he mere fact that a [person] has been arrested has very little, if any,
probative value in showing that he has engaged in misconduct.’” Id. (alterations in original) (citing
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957)).
74. Id. “Where it appears [to the employer] that the applicant . . . engaged in the conduct for which
he was arrested and that the conduct is job-related and relatively recent, exclusion is justified.” Id.
(emphasis added). The use of “appears,” however, poses another set of legal quandaries for employers,
or “investigators.” Id. (“[T]he investigator must determine whether the applicant is likely to have
committed the conduct alleged.”). According to the 1990 ARREST GUIDANCE, this requires an employer
either “to accept the employee’s denial or to attempt to obtain additional information and evaluate
his/her credibility.” Id. “An employer need not conduct an informal ‘trial’ or an extensive
investigation[,]” but it also may not “perfunctorily ‘allow the person an opportunity to explain’ and
ignore the explanation,” especially when the individual’s “claims could easily be verified by . . . a
previous employer or a police department.” Id. Reasonable efforts are affirmatively required. Other
courts, and the EEOC in fact, have held that employers must show the alleged conduct was actually
committed. See, e.g., City of Cairo v. Ill. Fair Emp’t Practices Comm’n, 315 N.E.2d 344, 359, 365 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding police officer applicant could not be absolutely barred from appointment solely
because he had been arrested where the Army amended their desertion claim and the state “rap sheet”
did not indicate the disposition of a disorderly conduct charge); EEOC Decision No. 76-87, 1976 WL
5000, at *1 n.2 (Jan. 23, 1976) (holding potential police officer could not be rejected based on one arrest
five years earlier for riding in stolen car because there was no conviction and applicant asserted that he
did not know that car was stolen); EEOC Decision No. 74-83, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 427
(1974) (finding no business justification for employer’s unconditional termination of all employees with
arrest records—all five of which were black—purportedly to cut down on thefts in the workplace
because the employer could produce no evidence that these employees were involved in any of the
reported office thievery, nor that the charging party’s past arrest was in any way related to theft).
75. In 2006, the Commission issued a new compliance manual dedicating roughly two pages to
arrest and conviction records in hiring and promotion decisions, essentially summarizing its previously
issued policy guidance. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 29–30.
76. Note the shift in language over time, from “policy statements” to “enforcement guidance.”
Counterintuitively, litigation statistics reflect that, since FY 2004, total suits filed by the EEOC and suits
specifically containing Title VII claims have steadily declined. EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997
Through FY 2012, U.S. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2014) [hereinafter LITIGATION STATS].
77. Indeed, since 2007, the EEOC has promoted its Eradicating Racism and Colorism from
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public meeting to examine arrest and conviction records as a hiring
barrier.78 After soliciting comments from the public,79 the
Commission voted to enact new guidelines because “[w]hen reentry
fails, public safety, our economy, the future of families and the
community as a whole are placed at risk.”80 Like the old, the new
Employment (E-RACE) initiative. E-RACE Goals and Objectives, U.S. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/initiatives/e-race/goals.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). Among the goals of the E-RACE initiative is
to “[d]evelop [s]trategies for [a]ddressing [twenty-first] [c]entury [m]anifestations of [d]iscrimination,”
which, according to the EEOC, includes developing “investigative and litigation strategies to address
selection criteria and methods that may foster discrimination based on race and other prohibited bases,
such as . . . arrest and conviction records, employment tests, [and] subjective decision making . . . .” Id.
In 2011, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder assembled a cabinet-level Interagency Reentry Council to
support the federal government’s efforts across twenty agencies to promote the successful reintegration
of ex-offenders. Federal Interagency Reentry Council Overview, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR.,
http://csgjusticecenter.org/documents/0000/1424/Reentry_Council_
Overview_one-pager_v2.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2012). In addition to federal efforts, several state law
enforcement agencies have embraced initiatives that encourage employment of ex-offenders. For
example, Texas’s Department of Criminal Justice has a Reentry and Integration Division and a Reentry
Task Force Workgroup that specifically focus on identifying employment opportunities for ex-offenders
and barriers that affect their access to training programs. Reentry and Integration Division—Reentry
Task Force, TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/divisions/rid/rid_texas_reentry_task_
force.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).
78. U.S. EEOC Meeting: EEOC to Examine Arrest and Conviction Records as a Hiring Barrier 3
(July 26, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Meeting Transcript], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/
7-26-11/transcript.cfm. Chair Naomi Earp convened the first meeting on the issue in 2008. Id. at 2.
79. Despite holding open the record for a period of fifteen days, the EEOC chose to sidestep the
APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). The Commission received and reviewed approximately 300 public
comments from prominent organizations such as the NAACP, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
American Insurance Association, the Retail Industry Leaders Association, and the D.C. Prisoners’
Project. Guidance Q&A, supra note 54. The comments, however, are only available for review in
Washington, D.C., and the Commission did not circulate the Guidance in advance of its vote. Meeting of
July 26, 2011–EEOC To Examine Arrest and Conviction Records as a Hiring Barrier, U.S. EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-26-11/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (noting that “[a]ll
comments received will be made available to members of the Commission and to Commission staff
working on the matters discussed at the meeting[,]” but public review will be limited to the EEOC
library); U.S. EEOC Meeting: Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction
Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 7–9 (Apr. 25, 2012)
[hereinafter 2012 Meeting Transcript], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/4-2512/transcript.cfm.
80. 2011 Meeting Transcript, supra note 78, at 3. Chairman Berrien credited President George W.
Bush and the signing of the Second Chance Act of 2007 (SCA) for these remarks. Id. Signed into law
April 9, 2008, the SCA authorizes federal grants to government agencies and nonprofit organizations to
provide educational and job placement services, as well as substance abuse treatment, housing support,
and family programming for offenders during and after incarceration. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 1 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 24–25 (discussing the
purpose of the SCA). In addition to funding proactive reentry programs, the government offers tax
credits to employers who hire ex-offenders through the Work Opportunity Tax Credit Program
(WOTC). 42 U.S.C. § 17541(e); see generally Work Opportunity Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
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Guidance presumes that employer use of criminal history creates a
disparate impact, and thus primarily analyzes the employer’s burden
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is “job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.”81 In
clarifying this defense, the EEOC identified only two safe harbors82
through which it impressed upon the business community new and
additional duties that are arguably burdensome, costly, and
controversial.83
http://www.doleta.gov/business/Incentives/opptax/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). Though broadly
configured, employment discrimination is not mentioned. See Second Chance Act of 2007. Furthermore,
legislative authority for the SCA expired on September 30, 2010, and neither house of Congress has
commenced a vote since the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced the reauthorization bill on July 21,
2011. See Second Chance Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1231, 112th Cong. (2011); Bill Summary &
Status, 112th Congress (2011-2012), S. 1231, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov (select
“Advanced Search;” click “112” and “Bill Number” from Search drop-down menu; enter “S. 1231;”
then follow “All Information” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 6, 2014); Second Chance Reauthorization Act
of 2013, S. 1690, 113th Cong. (2013); Bill Summary & Status, 113th Congress (2013-2014), S. 1690,
LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov (select “Advanced Search;” click “113” and “Bill Number”
from Search drop-down menu; enter “S. 1690;” then follow “All Congressional Actions” hyperlink)
(last visited Jan. 6, 2014); see also NAT’L ASS’N CNTYS., LOWER JAIL RECIDIVISM AND REINVEST THE
SAVINGS: SUPPORT THE SECOND CHANCE ACT (Aug. 16, 2012), available at http://www.naco.org/
legislation/policies/Documents/Justice%20and%20Public%20Safety/dh%20%20—%20%20Recidivism
Reinves.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). On January 2, 2013, however, President Barack Obama signed
into law the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which retroactively authorized extension of the
SCA’s WOTC program through December 31, 2013. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-240, § 309, 126 Stat. 2313, 2329 (2013) (codified as amended 26 U.S.C. § 51).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 10 (“National
data . . . supports a finding that criminal record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and
national origin.”). Though the employer does have an opportunity to disprove the plaintiff’s prima facie
showing, it may be difficult to do so. “[A]n employer may present regional or local data showing that
African American and/or Hispanic men are not arrested or convicted at disproportionately higher rates
in the employer’s particular geographic area” or its own applicant flow data “maintained pursuant to the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.” 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 10; see infra
note 84. The Commission cautions, however, that it will assess the credibility of the employer’s
evidence because such evidence may not reflect the “‘actual potential applicant pool since otherwise
qualified people might be discouraged from applying.’” 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 10 & n.79–80
(citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 365 (1977) (“stating that ‘[a] consistently enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job
applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of
explicit and certain rejection’”) (alteration in original)). An employer’s reputation in the community—
”from ex-offender employment programs, individual testimony, employer statements, . . . or publicly
posted notices”—may be scrutinized. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 10; cf. supra note 70.
82. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2, 14. This raises the question of what other circumstances
might satisfy the business necessity defense or whether the EEOC believes these are the only ways to do
so. See also discussion infra Part II.D.
83. See, e.g., 2011 Meeting Transcript, supra note 78, at 30, 33 (testimony of Adam Klein) (stating
“[t]he problem with [criminal history] information is that it’s messy, inaccurate, incredibly difficult to
interpret,” and that the guidelines lack predictability because there is “no indication of . . . the
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First, employers can consistently meet the business necessity
defense by formally validating the relationship between the criminal
conduct and the duties of a particular position using the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Uniform Guidelines),
which generally requires empirical data or statistics.84 As the EEOC
itself recognizes, however, “social science studies that assess whether
convictions are linked to future behaviors, traits, or conduct with
workplace ramifications . . . are rare.”85 Second, an employer may
create “targeted screens” using the Green factors as a floor,86 and
weighting” or measurement tools); id. at 12–13 (testimony of Robert Shriver) (describing the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management’s policy of delaying background checks until the agency “wants to
actually hire somebody” because “there’s a cost to each of these investigations”).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2013). The Uniform Guidelines, adopted in 1978, provide the following three
methods for employers to “validate” their employment tests: (1) demonstrate a statistical relationship
between scores on a selection procedure and job performance (criterion validity); (2) demonstrate that
the content of a selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job
(content validity); or (3) demonstrate that a selection procedure measures a construct (an underlying
human trait or characteristic, such as integrity) that is important for successful job performance
(construct validity). Id. § 1607.5. The detailed technical standards for such studies are addressed in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14.
85. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 15.
86. Id. at 18. Targeted screens, developed on the basis of “fact-based evidence, legal requirements,
and/or relevant and available studies[,]” exclude individuals from particular positions for specified
criminal conduct within a defined time period before employment. Id. at 17–18. The Guidance suggests
that an employer may be able to justify a targeted screen solely by the Green factors without additional
research, but such a screen must be “narrowly tailored to identify criminal conduct with a demonstrably
tight nexus to the position in question.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The EEOC offers the following
contrasting examples:
1. County Community Center . . . [adopts] a targeted rule prohibiting anyone with a
conviction for theft crimes (e.g., burglary, robbery, larceny, identity theft) from working
in a position with access to personal financial information for at least four years after the
conviction or release from incarceration. This rule was adopted by the County’s Human
Resources Department based on data from the County Corrections Department, national
criminal data, and recent recidivism research for theft crimes. The Community Center
also offers an opportunity for individuals identified for exclusion to provide information
showing that the exclusion should not be applied to them.
2. “Shred 4 You” employs over 100 people to pick up discarded files and sensitive
materials from offices, transport the materials to a secure facility, and shred and recycle
them. . . . [The company] has a targeted criminal conduct exclusion policy that prohibits
the employment of anyone who has been convicted of any crime related to theft or fraud
in the past five years, and the policy does not provide for any individualized
consideration. The company explains that its clients entrust it with handling sensitive and
confidential information and materials; therefore, it cannot risk employing people who
pose an above-average risk of stealing information.
Id. at 18–20. If the past criminal conduct of an applicant from a protected class violates the targeted
screen described, the EEOC is more likely to find “Shred 4 You” violated Title VII. Id.
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engage in Individualized Assessment (IA) for any applicant excluded
by the screen.87 At the point of developing the screen, an employer’s
incorporation of and compliance with exclusionary state or local laws
may not be a defense to liability.88 Furthermore, IA requires an
employer to provide notice to the applicant of his or her
disqualification because of a criminal record, and then an opportunity
for the rejected applicant to prove his or her case—that, based on
additional information, the arrest or conviction policy “as applied” is
inconsistent with business necessity.89 And although IA may not be
necessary in all cases, the EEOC does not articulate when or in what
cases such assessments are excused, thus arguably establishing a de
facto requirement by stressing that an employment screening process
without IA is more likely to violate Title VII.90
87. Id. at 2, 14, 18–20.
88. Id. at 24. The EEOC asserts that “state and local laws or regulations are preempted by Title VII
if they ‘purport[] to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice’ under Title VII.” Id. & n.166 (alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006)). Thus,
“if an employer’s exclusionary policy or practice is not job related and consistent with business
necessity, the fact that it was adopted to comply with a state or local law or regulation does not shield
the employer from Title VII liability.” Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). For analysis of this compliance
dilemma, see Timothy M. Cary, A Checkered Past: When Title VII Collides with State Statutes
Mandating Criminal Background Checks, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 499, 517–18 (2013). As opinion
columns and blogs from around the country suggest, this provision is among the Guidance’s most
controversial. See, e.g., James Bovard, Perform Criminal Background Checks at Your Peril, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 14, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323701904578276491630786
614.html (criticizing the EEOC’s initiation of an action against G4S Secure Solutions (G4S) for its
“refus[al] to hire a twice-convicted Pennsylvania thief as a security guard” despite G4S’s clear
compliance with Pennsylvania law).
89. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 14. The new Guidance directs that employers should assess the
following factors when making the individualized inquiry:
facts or circumstances surrounding the offense or conduct; [t]he number of offenses for
which the individual was convicted; [o]lder age at the time of conviction, or release from
prison; [e]vidence that the individual performed the same type of work, post conviction,
with the same or a different employer, with no known incidents of criminal conduct; []
length and consistency of employment history before and after the offense or conduct;
[r]ehabilitation efforts, [including] education [or] training; [e]mployment or character
references and any other information regarding fitness for the particular position; and
[w]hether the individual is bonded.
Id. at 18.
90. Id. Despite ratifying the Guidance, Commissioner Lipnic expressed some concern over this
provision:
[I]t is important to make clear that Title VII does not require an employer to provide such
an individualized assessment in any instance. This means that there can and will be
times . . . that an employer can lawfully screen out an applicant without further
inquiry . . . I had hoped that the final Guidance would have included an example of such
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II. MAKING SENSE OF A REGULATORY QUAGMIRE
Employers juggling legitimate business interests and compliance
with Title VII struggle with the new EEOC guidelines that seem
more expansive than what is required under current law91 and protect
individuals who do not neatly fit within the traditional concepts of a
suspect—or sympathetic—class.92 Reconciliation of the Guidance
and Title VII precedent is a necessary step considering that all Title
VII actions begin at the agency level.93 The focus of the analysis
must gauge the prospective legitimacy of the Individualized
Assessment method of establishing business necessity, the
lawful targeted practices. It does not, but . . . the lack of such examples should not be
taken to mean that they do not exist.
2012 Meeting Transcript, supra note 79, at 11. Furthermore, in theory, if the defendant carries its
burden, the burden will shift back to the plaintiff to prove pretext by demonstrating that the employer
refused to adopt an “alternative employment practice” that would continue to serve its legitimate
business needs but in a less discriminatory fashion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (k)(1)(C);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801, 804–05 (1973)). In practice, however, courts resolve disparate impact long before
this prong, and the Guidance thus dedicates only one sentence to it. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at
20.
91. See supra note 11 and accompanying text discussing El v. SEPTA and the permissibility of bright
line policies. Just as the Court alluded in Watson, Professor George Rutherglen notes that the Uniform
Guidelines, discussed supra note 84, “[strikingly depart] from the analysis of statistical evidence . . . in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.” RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 82; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994–99 (1988) (noting “plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case [of
disparate impact] goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer’s
work force” to a degree of proof from which a “substantial” inference of causation may be raised, and
that in defense, “employers are not required, even when defending standardized or objective tests, to
introduce formal ‘validation studies’ showing that particular criteria predict actual on-the-job
performance”) (emphasis added). The Uniform Guidelines do not require analysis of the relevant local
labor market, nor do they require statistical significance. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 82; see also
Terence G. Connor & Kevin J. White, The Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in
Employment Decisions: A Critique of the EEOC Guidance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 995–99 (2013)
(discussing the EEOC’s flawed use of nationwide statistics to justify the Guidance given that “impact”
statistics vary from state to state and from crime to crime, and noting, for example, that “proof that
African Americans in the nation have criminal records at a higher rate overall does not, in itself, show
that a criminal record exclusion policy has a disparate impact on African Americans in Omaha”).
Though the lenience afforded plaintiffs by the Uniform Guidelines has limited effect on their prima
facie showing of disparate impact, it has dramatic implications for employers defending on the basis of
business necessity. See Connor & White, supra, at 1003–04; see also infra discussion Part III.A.1.
92. See generally Aukerman, supra note 21, at 65. Of course, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
only intentional discrimination by government actors, and it does not have a disparate impact
component. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239–40 (1976).
93. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2007); supra note 37.
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Guidance’s distinct feature and the critical provision necessary to
achieve the underlying goal of equalizing opportunities for former
offenders.94 Principles of statutory interpretation suggest the
Guidance and IA method properly effectuate the goals of Title VII,
but reliance on the Guidance to constrain private employers’ freedom
of action is inconsistent with the spirit of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).95 Moreover, the enhanced content neither
improves workability nor is entitled to great deference in federal
court given its breadth.96
A. Matters of Interpretation
As decades of litigation reveal, business necessity—the crux of the
new Guidance—does not have a plain or straightforward meaning.97
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically employed the phrase
“‘business necessity,’ not ‘business convenience’ or some other
weaker term,” to describe what was required for an employer to
prevail against a Title VII disparate impact claim.98 Congress further
mandated that the standard must be met free of any dilution by Wards
Cove, making its preference clear.99 Thus, the Guidance’s imposition
94. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. By requiring assessment of underlying conduct, the EEOC seeks
to minimize stigma and dissuade fears about lawsuits alleging negligent hiring. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra
note 2, at 6 & n.52, 18; see also infra note 103.
95. See supra text accompanying note 9. The APA requires the use of rulemaking procedures for
every rule unless it falls within statutory exceptions excluding “interpretive rules,” “general statements
of policy,” or when such procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)-(B). Courts have repeatedly held that the exceptions should be construed
narrowly to prevent swallowing the legislatively adjudged value in notice and comment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d
1037, 1044–45 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also infra note 115 for analysis of whether, in the context of Title
VII, the EEOC has the authority to promulgate substantive regulations (as opposed to procedural
regulations) at all.
96. See discussion infra Part II.C.
97. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Precisely what constitutes a business
necessity cannot be reduced, of course, to a scientific formula, for it necessarily involves a case-specific
judgment . . . .”); see also discussion supra Part I.B and infra note 99.
98. El, 479 F.3d at 242. Congress’s choice of statutory language also indicates that the burden is not
insurmountable: the defense requires proof only that the contested practice is “‘consistent with business
necessity,’” not that it is “‘required.’” RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 83 (emphasis added).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36. In the domain of statutory law, Congress’s preference
is of course controlling. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 10–11; Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 666 (2001). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, did not
eliminate any ambiguity by turning the clock back to Griggs because, on the facts of the case, the Court
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of serious, good faith consideration of an applicant’s qualifications
exclusive of his or her criminal record through IA generally comports
with Congress’s pro-plaintiff approach.100
Examining the larger scheme of antidiscrimination law, the second
crucial question in analyzing the validity of the new Guidance is how
a claim of discrimination that is asserted today resembles the kind of
discrimination that Congress meant to eliminate under the Civil
Rights Acts.101 The underlying purpose of Title VII was not to
protect people with criminal records but rather to protect racial
minorities.102 “If the theory of disparate impact [was] designed only
to prevent hidden discrimination, then it would result in liability only
when there is [some] evidence of disparate treatment”—an argument
most employers would champion in light of vocal concerns that
policies are designed to prevent increasingly common negligent
hiring suits, not to enforce secret racial biases.103 By contrast, if
disparate impact was designed to remove arbitrary barriers that
historically operated to favor opportunities for white employees, then
the Guidance’s heavy burden of justification on the employer
rightfully serves the independent purpose of eliminating systematic
disadvantages, even for former offenders.104 A third key component,
was not required to choose between the distinct phrases it employed to describe the defendant’s burden:
“business necessity,” “related to job performance,” “meaningful study of their relationship to jobperformance ability,” and “manifest relationship to the employment in question.” Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971). The Third Circuit in El acutely noted this deficiency in attempting to
implement the Griggs standard. El, 479 F.3d at 241–42.
100. See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact
Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1514–16 (1996) (arguing the most
powerful argument in favor of a “strict” necessity standard is the Civil Rights Act’s rejection of Wards
Cove); see also supra text accompanying notes 34 and 35. But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (noting that Title VII “does not purport to limit the other qualities and
characteristics that employers may take into account in making employment decisions”), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
101. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 14.
102. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
103. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 73. For thorough analysis of negligent hiring claims involving
former offenders and their impact on employers, see generally Stacy A. Hickox, Employer Liability for
Negligent Hiring of Ex-Offenders, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1001 (2011) and Katherine A. Peebles, Note,
Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How State Legislatures Can Save Employers from Inevitable
Liability, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397 (2012).
104. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 73.
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one must consider to what extent each theory emphasizes merit in
hiring decisions.105 Merit determined by the employer supports
business discretion; merit set by some objective standard—like
statistics—results in judicial reexamination.106
Congress took many statutory interpretation tools off the table
when it limited the courts to one memorandum and the Griggs
progeny to decipher the meaning of “business necessity” under Title
VII disparate impact analysis.107 Turning to the seminal opinion in
Griggs, the Supreme Court attributed to Congress the intent “to
achieve equality,” a forward-looking, expansive view reflective of
Title VII’s broad language.108 Most recently echoing this reasoning
from Griggs, Justice Ginsburg vigorously argued in dissent in Ricci
v. DeStefano that, by instructing employers to avoid needlessly
exclusionary selection processes, Title VII’s disparate impact
provision calls for a “‘race-neutral means to increase
minority . . . participation.’”109 The very facts of Griggs, however,
seem to suggest it was a case about ferreting out hidden intent: before
the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke Power
openly discriminated on the basis of race, and though the company
implemented its “neutral” aptitude requirements on the effective date
of Title VII, it was not until five months after the charge was filed in
Griggs that it promoted a single black employee out of its lowest

105. Id. at 74 Note that in Griggs the Court stressed that the recognition of disparate impact is fully
consistent with a competitive meritocracy. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). The
Court assured that “Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better
qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress
has made such qualifications the controlling factor . . . .” Id. For argument that Griggs and the disparate
impact doctrine are in fact unfriendly to meritocratic objectives, see generally Amy Wax, The Dead End
of “Disparate Impact,” 12 NAT’L AFF. 53 (2012).
106. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 74.
107. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. This also precludes interpreters from relying on
the legislative history of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the very act from which Congress
copied verbatim the definition of business necessity less than one year later. See Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 102(b)(6), (c)(4), 103(a), 104 Stat. 327, 332–34
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12113 (2006)). For additional instructive comparisons
between the ADA and Title VII, see infra notes 115, 123 and 150.
108. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30; RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 11.
109. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 627 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)).
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department.110 Because Griggs’s interchangeable reliance on Title
VII’s multiple goals is not determinative of the Guidance’s validity
standing alone, the next question addresses whether the EEOC’s
procedural course provides the necessary force to withstand private,
political, and judicial scrutiny.
B. Intent to Bind or Binding Effect? Semantic Gymnastics Over
Administrative Hurdles
As described in Part I.C, the EEOC has issued a dizzying array of
documents including enforcement guidance,111 policy guidance,112
policy statements,113 and compliance manuals114 on the issue of
arrests and conviction records. However, the explicit delegation of
rulemaking authority in Title VII directs the Commission to issue
“suitable procedural regulations to carry out [its] provisions.”115
Professor Robert A. Anthony persuasively asserts that
[t]he use of nonlegislative policy documents116 generally serves
the important function of informing staff and the public about
agency positions, and in the great majority of instances is proper
and indeed very valuable[;] [b]ut the misuse of such documentsto bind, where legislative rules should have been used-carries

110. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426–28 & n.2.
111. Guidances typically set forth the criteria by which the agency will select cases for prosecution or
other enforcement action. See generally 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2.
112. E.g., 1990 ARREST GUIDANCE, supra note 72.
113. E.g., 1987 CONVICTION GUIDANCE and 1987 STATISTICS GUIDANCE, supra note 68.
114. E.g., COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 17.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The delegation provision further requires that
“[r]egulations issued . . . shall be in conformity with the standards and limitations of [the APA].” Id.
Among other laws, the agency also has primary enforcement authority over the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and Title I of the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 628; 42 U.S.C. § 12116. In contrast with
Title VII, the ADEA broadly authorizes the EEOC to “issue such rules and regulations as it may
consider necessary or appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 628. The explicit terms of the ADA required the EEOC
to issue regulations to carry out Title I within one year of the date of the statute’s enactment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12116.
116. The relevant distinction between legislative rules and nonlegislative policy statements is “not the
nature of the questions they address but the authority and intent with which they are issued and the
resulting effect on the power of a court to depart from the decision embodied in the rule.” Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1321–22 & n.40 (1992).
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great costs.117

Does the Guidance, particularly the de facto IA requirement, tip this
delicate balance?
Though the intricacies of administrative rulemaking are beyond the
scope of this Note, the threshold step in the analysis under the APA
asks “whether a given [document] interprets sufficiently concrete
statutory language to qualify as interpretive.”118 As shifts in judicial
interpretation demonstrate, policy statements that use broad language
like business necessity are amorphous but nevertheless have tangible
meaning, especially when applied in the negative119: for instance, a
retail establishment’s adherence to perceived customer preferences in
enforcing a grooming policy is not a necessary business practice.120
But where a policy statement uses amorphous statutory text to require
parties to act affirmatively to be safe from prosecution rather than
merely refrain from definable practices, it is more difficult to
conclude that the statement draws any tangible meaning from the
statute.121 For example, unlike the ADA, which codifies a duty of
reasonable accommodation,122 Title VII has no such provision out of
117. Id. at 1317. The costs are perhaps less than tangible: uncertainty and confusion about the reach
and legal quality of the agency’s standards breed wasted effort among private parties trying to “puzzle
out” how far they are bound or affected. Id. This confusion and ultimate tolerance only nurtures the
tendency to overregulate. Id. And if guidances and manuals “can visit upon the public the same practical
effects as legislative actions do, but are far easier to accomplish, agency heads (or, more frequently,
subordinate officials) will be enticed into using them.” Id.
118. Id. at 1339; see, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 79 (2002) (identifying the
threshold question as “whether [the ADA] leaves a gap for the EEOC to fill”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). In theory, interpretive rules do not create
new law because they “merely restate or explain the preexisting . . . intentions of Congress.” Anthony,
supra note 116, at 1313, 1324.
119. See Anthony, supra note 116, at 1339 & n.161.
120. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 798–99 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding Domino’s
policy prohibiting delivery men from having facial hair inconsistent with business necessity and in
violation of Title VII because approximately 50% of African-American men have skin condition that
causes shaving to be either impossible or extremely difficult); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(iii) (2013)
(prohibiting customer preference as a justification for gender discrimination).
121. Anthony, supra note 116, at 1324–26, 1339 n.161.
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)(B), 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). Professor
Christine Jolls simplifies reasonable accommodation to mean any “legal rule that requires employers to
incur special costs in response to the distinctive needs . . . of particular, identifiable demographic groups
of employees,” and argues that important aspects of disparate impact liability are in fact accommodation
requirements. Jolls, supra note 99, at 648.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss2/6

26

Nichols: Where There's Smoke, There's Fire?: The Cloud of Suspicion Surrou

2014]

THE EEOC'S NEW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE

617

which the EEOC can develop affirmative policy.123 If the conclusion
is that the Guidance goes beyond interpretation of existing
legislation, the second inquiry is what the Guidance “intends
substantively and whether it is meant to be binding.”124 An agency’s
intent is often difficult to ascertain, but the frequency with which the
EEOC Commissioners publicly speak on this issue provides ample
material from which to make an informed argument.125
On the other hand, enforcement policy is “ordinarily issued
nonlegislatively,” and the articulation of lengthy, detailed, and
specific standards is not unusual.126 Moreover, where a statement
provides for the future exercise of discretion in its application, notice
and comment are not required.127 In this sense, the EEOC tiptoed the

123. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. In fact, Title VII contains a provision expressly prohibiting
required preferences. Id. § 2000e-2(j). For a brief comparison of the EEOC’s rulemaking authority
under ADA and Title VII, see also supra note 115. The ADA also comprehensively regulates preemployment medical inquiries, and the Guidance seems to advocate for a similar model. Compare 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14 (permitting employers to require that a disabled employee submit to a medical exam
after he or she has been hired or to condition a bona fide offer of employment on the results of such an
exam when all entering employees are so subjected), and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (indicating that if a postoffer, pre-work medical exam serves as the basis for withdrawal of an offer, the employer must show the
reasons for withdrawal are either (1) “job-related and consistent with business necessity” and no
reasonable accommodation would allow the individual to perform the essential functions of the job, or
(2) that the rejected individual “pose[s] a direct threat to . . . health or safety”), with 2012 GUIDANCE,
supra note 2, at 13–14 (“As a best practice, . . . the Commission recommends that employers not ask
about convictions on job applications and that, if and when they make such inquiries, the inquiries be
limited . . . .”).
124. Anthony, supra note 116, at 1339.
125. See generally 2012 Meeting Transcript, supra note 79; 2011 Meeting Transcript, supra note 78;
U.S. EEOC: EEOC Meeting on Employment Discrimination Faced by Individuals with Arrest and
Conviction Records (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/11-2008/transcript.cfm.
126. Anthony, supra note 116, at 1338–39.
127. See McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1319–20, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(finding an agency’s “open-mindedness [toward its own rules] in individual proceedings can substitute
for a general rulemaking”); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
the FDA could treat its rules as pure policy statements in the future, but “must avoid giving [those rules]
the kind of substantive significance that it now so plainly attaches to them”); Anthony, supra note 116,
at 1359–63. This analysis poses a lose-lose for defendants: agencies may impose a policy with a
practical binding effect upon private parties, but also plausibly argue to the courts that the informal
issuance and reserved discretion prove there was no obligation to proceed legislatively. Anthony, supra
note 116, at 1360. To remedy this circumvention, Anthony advocates instead for a test that focuses on
whether and to what extent the policy constrains the discretion of its intended targets—private parties—
so as to bind them, rather than on the discretion left to the agency itself by its own devices. Id. at 1360–
61.
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line: IA may or may not be required to comply with Title VII,128 and
the Commission expressly noted that it merely intends the Guidance
to be an informative practice tool meant “to facilitate voluntary
compliance.”129 Ultimately, because employers are typically unable
to tolerate the delay or cost that a contest would entail,130 the IA
norm will elude judicial scrutiny.131 The legal limbo line the EEOC
has elected to dance, however, may ultimately disserve the
population it seeks to protect. By failing to give its business necessity
interpretation “teeth” via notice and comment while simultaneously
propagating a targeted enforcement strategy,132 the EEOC transforms
the Guidance into an omnipresent, unpredictable litigation threat that
breeds distrust among employers.
C. The Supreme Court and the Federal Judiciary: Charting Their
Own Course?
In the area of federal antidiscrimination law, the U.S. Supreme
Court and the lower courts rarely defer to EEOC regulations and
guidance even though Skidmore reflects that administrative
interpretations should receive respect if they are research-driven and
enacted with procedural care on an issue of statutory ambiguity.133 In
128. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 18.
129. 2012 Meeting Transcript, supra note 79, at 13; see also 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 3
(listing intended users).
130. For example, in 2012, 14.4% of charges filed under Title VII resulted in outcomes favorable to
charging parties in the form of negotiated settlements, withdrawals of a complaint with promise of
benefits, or successful conciliations. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, FY 1997–FY
2012, U.S. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Jan. 24,
2014) [hereinafter TITLE VII STATS]. Only 3.5% of unsuccessful conciliations, charges closed but
considered for litigation, resulted in suits at the federal level (66 total suits filed with Title VII claims,
divided by 1,899 unsuccessful conciliations during fiscal year 2012). Id.; LITIGATION STATS, supra note
76.
131. See generally Anthony, supra note 116, at 1340.
132. Issued less than two months before the Guidance, the Strategic Plan provides that identification,
investigation, and litigation of systemic discrimination cases—pattern or practice, policy, and class
cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or
geographic area—is the top priority, with prevention and education constituting secondary objectives.
See U.S. EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2016, at 3, 14 (2012) [hereinafter
STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf.
133. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (finding that just because “policies and
standards are not reached . . . in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to respect” and
that the weight of such policy judgments “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its
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the early years after the enactment of Title VII, the courts played a
unique role in filling statutory gaps and thus developed certain
expertise that they are perhaps reluctant to relinquish.134 In assessing
the impact of the new Guidance as the EEOC increasingly pursues
systematic enforcement actions, it is therefore important to consider
the federal courts’ likely gloss on the business necessity issue.
1. The Record on Record-Based Exclusions
The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed criminal recordbased employment restrictions in the context of Title VII.135
Although inexact bases for comparison,136 two important themes
emerge from the Court’s holdings under the Fourteenth
Amendment.137 First, in all the cases where the Court invalidated
record-based policies, the private interests at stake were significant:
for example, Skinner v. Oklahoma concerned the right to bear
children, and James v. Strange concerned the ability to protect a
consideration”); see also Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1938–49 (2006). Only twice has the Supreme Court applied Skidmore to
EEOC policies and agreed with the agency’s interpretation of an antidiscrimination law. See e.g.,
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448–51 (2003) (noting that the Court
was persuaded by the Compliance Manual’s focus on common law “touchstone of control” in deciding
whether director-shareholder physicians are employees under the ADA); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (finding the EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment under
Title VII “appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with, the existing case law”). Recently,
Justice Ginsburg corroborated the Court’s lack of deference in this area, stating, “Recognizing EEOC’s
‘enforcement responsibility’ under Title VII, we have previously accorded the Commission’s position
respectful consideration. Yet the Court today does not so much as mention EEOC’s counsel.” Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 626 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
134. Hart, supra note 133, at 1954–58; see generally also Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 225
(1976); infra note 195 (describing individual Justices’ Title VII experience).
135. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2007). In New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Court dealt with criminal behavior on
the part of an applicant, but neither case squarely addressed the issue of past convictions or the precise
contours of the business necessity defense. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31
(1979) (finding employer’s refusal to hire individuals using methadone to treat addiction served the
“legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 807 (1973) (sustaining an employer’s refusal to rehire an employee on the ground that the
employee participated in various disruptive, illegal protests in front of employer’s premises).
136. See supra note 92.
137. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Barsky v.
Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
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minimum level of income and assets from involuntary
garnishment.138 Second, much like the Guidance requires, the Court
generally demanded that the legislature document a rational
relationship between the restrictions and the problems they were
designed to combat.139 Most instructive of these cases is Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners in which the Court recognized the right to
practice one’s profession.140 Standing for the proposition that
occupational restrictions based on contact with the criminal justice
system must take into consideration the lapse of time—including the
political climate of the era141—and the nature of the offense, the
Schware court rejected the conclusion that a past criminal conviction
alone permits an inference of present immoral character.142
Even though the right to employment is not fundamental,143 this
means-ends tailoring suggests the Court has been willing to parse the
facts of arrest and conviction exclusions on a case-by-case basis; this
compares favorably to the Guidance’s approach requiring
justification with particularity via IA under Title VII. Reconciling the
roles of intent, however, is perhaps more difficult and
counterintuitive: if the government intentionally discriminates against
138. Strange, 407 U.S. at 135–36, 140; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. By contrast, the law in De Veau,
which the Court upheld, “merely concerned the right to be a union official, an arguably less significant
interest.” Aukerman, supra note 21, at 37; see also De Veau, 363 U.S. at 158–60.
139. E.g., Strange, 407 U.S. at 141–42 (acknowledging the state’s interest in recoupment, but finding
it irrational to deny income protection to former offenders solely because those debts resulted from state
representation in criminal proceedings); Aukerman, supra note 21, at 37.
140. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957). Rudolph Schware was excluded from
taking the bar exam in New Mexico because of his record of arrests from twenty years prior, among
other things. Id. at 234–35.
141. See id. at 242–46. The bar examiners disqualified Schware, citing his membership in the
Communist Party from 1932 to 1940 and his arrest for allegedly recruiting young men to aid the
Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War. Id. at 236–37. The Court, however, noted that “Schware joined the
Communist Party when he was a young man during the midst of this country’s greatest depression,” and
that “[d]uring the prelude to World War II many idealistic young men volunteered to help causes they
believed right.” Id. at 242, 245. Because there was nothing in the record to indicate that Schware ever
engaged in or advocated for any action to overthrow the U.S. government and few Americans would
have regarded his conduct as evidence of moral turpitude at the time, the Court held that the recordbased restriction deprived Schware of due process. Id. at 245–47; see also Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc.,
316 F. Supp. 401, 402 (C.D. Cal 1970) (thirteen of African-American plaintiff’s fourteen arrests, for
which he was never convicted, occurred before 1959, during the height of the civil rights movement),
aff’d and vacated in part on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1972).
142. Schware, 353 U.S. at 243, 242.
143. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
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former offenders, it will be subject only to rational basis review,144
but when a private employer unintentionally discriminates against the
same group under Title VII, it theoretically will be subjected to the
comparatively heightened level of scrutiny advanced in the
Guidance.145
2. A Private Sector Political Question?
Though the Court is undoubtedly capable of parsing factual
questions and policy judgments inherent in legislative tailoring, that
does not mean it always will do so. “When the EEOC interprets
federal antidiscrimination laws in ways that appear to favor plaintiffemployees over defendant-employers,” federal courts generally
decline to defer to the agency.146 In the case of Title VII litigation,
the EEOC’s presumption of disparate impact as a matter of policy—
softening the single greatest hurdle for plaintiffs at the initial steps of

144. The aforementioned cases spoke in terms of “rationality,” but also required “reasonably close
fit” between the occupation and the offense in question. Aukerman, supra note 21, at 51. Aukerman thus
argues that the Court in fact applies “rational basis with bite” to record-based exclusions, as the
requirement for tailoring arises only under heightened scrutiny (not rational basis review); heightened
scrutiny is reserved for groups that qualify as a suspect class and former offenders traditionally do not so
qualify. Id. at 51, 66–69 & n.2.
145. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
146. Hart, supra note 133, at 1959. Indeed, recently, the Supreme Court dismissed as “nebulous,”
“generic,” “circular,” and “unpersuasive” the EEOC’s conclusions with respect to the use of (1)
“motivating factor” causation in Title VII retaliation cases, a standard that generally allows plaintiffemployees to elude adverse summary judgment decisions in the early stages of a case, and (2) an
expansive definition of “supervisor” for the purpose of workplace harassment liability that would permit
more plaintiff-employees to prove their cases with the aid of strict liability. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533–34 (2013); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 & n.4
(2013); see also, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478–82 (1999) (rejecting the
EEOC’s regulation requiring that disability be evaluated without regard to mitigating measures),
overturned due to legislative action in ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 245, 256–58 (1991) (rejecting the EEOC’s opinion
that Title VII applied to U.S. citizens employed overseas), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077, as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500 (2006); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976) (limiting the reach of Title
VII by rejecting the EEOC’s view that pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination), superseded by
statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, as recognized in
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73,
84–87 (2002) (applying Chevron deference to EEOC regulation permitting employers to exclude
individuals whose disabilities pose a direct threat to their own health under the ADA, thus upholding a
more restrictive view of the defense than that for which the plaintiff-employee advocated).
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enforcement—and the imposition of IA reflect such an imbalance.147
Moreover, by necessitating detailed scrutiny of employers’ human
resources policies when litigation does ensue, the EEOC forces
courts to enter the realm of restructuring business practices and
managing routine personnel matters, which they are often reluctant to
do.148
Facially, however, the disparate impact issue at hand is
straightforward: hiring policies excluding former offenders
disproportionately impact African-Americans and Hispanics because
of disparate enforcement of criminal justice—from the beat to the
courtroom.149 However, we cannot ignore how the “former offender”
variable transforms the debate to some extent.150 The occupational
147. See discussion supra Part I.C.
148. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (“[T]he judiciary should
proceed with care before mandating that an employer must adopt a plaintiff’s alternative selection or
hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
149. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. Today’s criminal justice crisis at the enforcement,
prosecutorial, and sentencing levels is reminiscent of the severe educational inequalities that ultimately
led the Court to find Duke Power’s professionally-designed cognitive tests and diploma requirement to
violate Title VII in Griggs: a societal deficiency—at no fault of the employer—with lasting and
pervasive effects. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (identifying longstanding
educational disparities due to segregated schooling).
150. Title VII protects all workers against discrimination based on race, color, national origin,
religion, and sex, even if they are white, male, and atheist. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). However,
as Miriam J. Aukerman writes, people “are not born with [criminal] records, but rather acquire them as a
result of their own choices.” Aukerman, supra note 21, at 65. Thus, the question becomes whether Title
VII should be used for the benefit of individuals whose personal choices to act or to associate result in
adverse consequences under the law for which they are accountable, and whether the IA requirement,
essentially “an unfunded mandate that shifts the cost of addressing difficulties associated with
[applicants’] immutable characteristics to employers,” should be left for the legislature to implement.
Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1483, 1542–43 (2011). Note that the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
exception under Title VII and reasonable accommodation under the ADA operate in much the same way
as IA in that they often require modification of policies to facilitate job performance and thus impose
less obvious costs on employers as a result. Id. at 1506; Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 24–25 (1996)
(suggesting that, under the ADA, for example, “employers [] might incur higher costs to accurately
assess the productivity of the disabled than other applicants for employment” or to revise testing
requirements that produce adverse effects on a class of applicants even though such costs may be only
perceived or marginal, or indeed, produce long-term efficiency gains); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(indicating that businesses may qualify personnel on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin where
those characteristics are “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (mandating accommodation of religious practices and observance);
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B) (defining reasonable accommodation under the ADA). Unlike IA,
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and corresponding economic rights due to former offenders are
unavoidably tinged with politics, perhaps more so than any other
context in which the Court has routinely addressed disparate
hiring.151 Individuals with criminal records are the “one group whom
it is still permissible to hate.”152 Eschewing the lack of popular
support and inevitable death in committee, a few bold politicians
introduce and re-introduce legislation to correct employer abuses of
credit and criminal background checks.153 Some laws at both the
federal and state levels do limit the use of such information, at least
for specific positions.154 However, these positive efforts to some
extent reinforce the courts’ hands-off approach: “distinctive
legislative response[s]” to the plight of former offenders who have
unique problems may in and of themselves “belie[] . . . a

however, both are statutorily mandated with explicit qualifications. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (undue
hardship defense); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (noting that “[t]he BFOQ defense is written narrowly,
and this Court has read it narrowly[,]” and the statute’s multiple “terms of restriction [] indicate that the
exception reaches only special situations”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84
(1977) (holding employers do not bear more than a de minimus burden to accommodate religious
needs).
151. See supra note 149.
152. Aukerman, supra note 21, at 18. “Politicians compete to be the toughest on crime[,]” “websites
brand thousands of people as sex offenders, prisoners, and criminals[,]” and “[m]any individuals with
criminal records are literally disenfranchised.” Id. at 18–19, 52.
153. See, e.g., Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 321, 112th Cong. (2011) (originally submitted as
H.R. 3149, 111th Cong. (2009)).
154. Only eleven states prohibit employment discrimination against individuals with criminal
convictions: Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Washington
prohibit discrimination by public employers, while Hawaii, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
extend that prohibition to public and private employers. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, NAT’L ASS’N
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS (NACDL) RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT, CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL
RECORDS IN LICENSING AND EMPLOYMENT (2013), available at https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/
files/resource_center/2012_restoration_project/Consideration_of_Criminal_Record_in_Licensing_And_
Employment.pdf. Additionally, thirty-two cities or counties have enacted “ban the box” or “move the
box” initiatives whereby employers either remove arrest or conviction questions from applications, defer
background checks until later in the hiring process, or only perform background checks for certain
positions. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT (NELP), BAN THE BOX: MAJOR U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES
ADOPT FAIR HIRING POLICIES TO REMOVE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH
CRIMINAL RECORDS 24 (2012), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/14047d447967924539_zcm6bz5bp.pdf.
Only seven of those ordinances apply to private employers. Id. Of course, an equal or greater number of
state and federal laws specifically exclude individuals with conviction records from working in positions
ranging from port workers to insurance agents, and from receiving certain benefits like Medicare. 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a), (b); 18 U.S.C. § 1033(e); 46 U.S.C. § 70105(c); see also 2012 GUIDANCE, supra
note 2, at 20–24.
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corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary.”155
The Court is unlikely to test record-based exclusions instituted by
private employers—even as reformulated by EEOC “experts” in the
Guidance—because of the political charge surrounding the issue and
lingering underlying disparate impact questions post-Ricci.156
D. What the Guidance Does Not Say
Despite including statistics and a heft of footnotes, critics lament
that the Commission ignored information disfavoring their position157
155. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443–44, 453 (1985) (rejecting
heightened equal protection scrutiny for disabled individuals in part because successful legislative
efforts enacted on their behalf disproved “continuing antipathy or prejudice”).
156. See generally Hart, supra note 133, at 1959; see also supra note 53. Margaret Colgate Love
posits, however, that the policy goal of mitigating collateral consequences of criminal conviction finds
some new legal support in Padilla v. Kentucky, a recent Sixth Amendment case. Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (finding defense counsel has a constitutional obligation to warn defendants
when a guilty plea will result in deportation); Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society:
Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J.
753, 756–59 (2011).
157. Connor & White, supra note 91, at 999–1001; Letter from Todd Gaziano, Gail Heriot & Peter
Kirsanaow, Comm’rs, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, to EEOC (Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter UCCR
Letter], http://cdia.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/US%20Commission%20on%20Civil%20Right-0001.pdf.
Economists Harry Holzer and Steven Raphael and public policy professor Michael Stoll published two
scholarly papers challenging the EEOC’s position that strictly regulating the use of arrest and conviction
information in hiring decisions will lead to increased employment of minority candidates. Harry J.
Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and
the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451 (2006); Michael A. Stoll, Ex-Offenders,
Criminal Background Checks, and Racial Consequences in the Labor Market, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
381 (2009). Both studies suggest employers tend to overestimate the likelihood that African-American
applicants have prior felony convictions, and thus systematic background checks may actually increase
the likelihood that a minority candidate is hired because employers are able to fill their information
gaps. Holzer, Raphael & Stoll, supra, at 452, 465 (observing that during the hiring process “[e]mployers
who check [backgrounds] will be more likely to eliminate black applicants on the basis of revealed
information, while employers who do not [check backgrounds] may [nevertheless] eliminate black
applicants on the basis of perceived criminality,” and ultimately finding that employers who do check
applicants’ backgrounds are 8.4 to 10.7% more likely to have hired an African-American into the most
recently filled position); Stoll, supra, at 403–05 (finding, for employers that check applicants’
backgrounds, approximately 12% of their most recently hired workers were black males, “while the
comparable figure for those employers who do not check is 3 percent”). Despite the fact that three
members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights in their personal capacities brought the
Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll data to the EEOC’s attention in a comment letter shortly after the EEOC’s
initial July 26, 2011 hearing on the subject, the Guidance summarily discounts the data in a footnote.
See 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 7 n.57; UCCR Letter, supra. Reflecting the tension among even
like-tasked executive branch agencies, the full Commission on Civil Rights has since initiated an
investigation to determine whether the new Guidance policy encourages or discourages former offender
re-entry into the job market, and most recently held public hearings in December 2012. Press Release,
U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Announces Briefing on the Impact of
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and punted on the important details: How far back can criminal
records be checked?158 Must experts craft the “targeted screens”?159
Must employers develop an independent “targeted screen” for every
available position?160 How and by whom are independent
assessments of “conduct or facts underlying an offense” to be carried
out to ensure compliance?161 What corresponding privacy issues may
be implicated? If a policy is not sufficiently “targeted,” but the
employer-defendant engages in IA, is the company still liable?162 Do
repeat offenses—even if mere arrests—dictate greater deference to
employers? Because the Commission will presume that employers
use the information obtained from their applicants and others in
making employment decisions,163 what paper trail must an employer
build to disprove the assertion?
Criminal Background Checks and the EEOC’s Conviction Records Policy on the Employment of Black
and Hispanic Workers (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.usccr.gov/press/2012/PR_1129_CriminalBackgroundChecks.pdf.
158. Under federal law, consumer reporting agencies cannot report an arrest that is over seven years
old, while convictions may be reported indefinitely. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2), (a)(5). Many experts,
however, argue that the growing body of desistence and recidivism research should be figured into the
calculus. One study reported that individuals who remain crime-free for ten years after conviction are no
more likely to commit another offense than a person with no record. See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori
Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY
327, 331–32, 338–39 (2009). But see infra note 187. Another found that “by the time a person who was
arrested at age 18 reaches age 24 without committing any more crimes”—only six years—”he is
statistically no more likely than someone with no prior record to [recidivate].” NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT (NELP), EMPLOYMENT SCREENING FOR CRIMINAL RECORDS: ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS 8 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/
agcommentsnelp.pdf.
159. Kevin P. McGowan, Employers Must Justify Use of Criminal Checks Under EEOC Guidance,
Speakers Say, HUM. RESOURCES REP., June 18, 2012, available at Bloomberg 30 HRR 666. Consider
§ 2000e-2(h), which generally exempts the use of “professionally developed” tests from the category of
unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). The Griggs court, however, noted that this safe
harbor applies only to tests, not substantive qualifications like a diploma, and thus presumably not to
record-based exclusions either—even if experts develop such policies. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433–36 (1971).
160. EEOC Commissioner Victoria Lipnic, speaking at the National Conference on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law almost one year after the Commission issued its revised Guidance,
suggested the answer to this question is “yes”: the first step of an employer’s protocol is to create a
“matrix” of available jobs and the types of criminal offenses that would preclude hiring of any given
applicant. Kevin P. McGowan, Lawyers, EEOC Official Discuss Guidance on Potential Bias in
Criminal History Checks, DAILY LAB. REP., Apr. 5, 2013, available at Bloomberg 66 DLR B-3.
161. See supra text accompanying note 89.
162. McGowan, supra note 159.
163. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal 1970), aff’d and vacated in part on
other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 9 n.64.
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As the aforementioned questions demonstrate, employers’
discomfort with the Guidance’s demand that they expend resources
or tolerate significant inconvenience in order to accommodate
employees’ past misconduct, poor judgment, or any other
formulation of character relating to legal mishaps is
understandable.164 Moreover, people with criminal records typically
have a limited education and few job skills,165 and thus the burden of
the Guidance is likely to be unequally distributed across certain
industries—particularly large-scale employers with high turnover.166
Of even deeper concern is that application of disparate impact in
protest against practices that it can never be used effectively to
control may exact a high toll in corporate cooperation: will
employers simply find another way to investigate an applicant’s
background to elude the Guidance’s policies?167 Aside from the
details of a defense, will employers merely roll the dice, knowing
that the likelihood of victory on summary judgment in federal court

164. Hoffman, supra note 150, at 1542.
165. JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, EX-OFFENDERS AND THE
LABOR MARKET 5–6 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders2010-11.pdf; Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Employment Barriers Facing ExOffenders 4–5 (Urban Institute Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper, 2003), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410855_holzer.pdf.
166. Cary, supra note 88, at 517–18; Hoffman, supra note 150, at 1542–43.
167. Aside from the criminal enforcement issues described in the text supra accompanying notes 3–5,
numerous studies reflect another systemic problem: accurate reporting at both the state and federal
levels. A significant number of criminal record databases are incomplete, recording final dispositions in
only 50% of arrests. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL
HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 17 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/ag_bgchecks_
report.pdf. Other studies document inaccuracies when criminal records lack “unique” information or
because of “misspellings, clerical errors or intentionally inaccurate identification information provided
by search subjects who wish to avoid discovery of their prior criminal activities.” INTERSTATE
IDENTIFICATION INDEX NAME CHECK EFFICACY: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO THE U.S.
ATTORNEY GENERAL 7, 22 (1999), available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/III_Name_Check.pdf
(finding approximately 5.5% of 82,601 applicants in sample were inaccurately identified by a “name
check” to have records). Even if public access to criminal records has been restricted by a court order to
seal or expunge, this does not guarantee that private companies or news corporations also will purge the
information from their systems or media archives. SEARCH, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. &
STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RECORD INFORMATION 83 (2005), available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf; see
also Douglas Belkin, More Job Seekers Scramble to Erase Their Criminal Past, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125789494126242343.html?KEYWORDS=Douglas
+Belkin.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss2/6

36

Nichols: Where There's Smoke, There's Fire?: The Cloud of Suspicion Surrou

2014]

THE EEOC'S NEW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE

627

is high and the probable loss of significant consumer goodwill
low?168
III. MOVING FORWARD: CAN THE ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE
WITHSTAND THE HEAT?
None of the proposed reforms seeking to modify the balance
between employer prerogatives and the goals of antidiscrimination
law, in the context of former offenders, address the issue of criminal
records within the current disparate impact framework—where the
EEOC has placed all its eggs.169 Classifying individuals with criminal
records as a suspect class under the Fourteenth Amendment,170
expanding “ban the box” policies,171 reforming the FCRA,172 shifting
to the mixed-motive model of employment discrimination,173 using
integrity testing in place of background checks,174 anonymous

168. See supra note 53; see also Cary, supra note 88, at 517–22 (recommending, on balance, that
employers should ignore the EEOC guidelines and comply with state criminal background check
provisions given the low probability that an employer will face legal action by the EEOC and the high
potential cost of ignoring an applicable state law, which may result in more predictable tort liability).
169. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Aukerman, supra note 21.
171. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES INST. FOR YOUTH, EDUC. & FAMILIES & NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT
(NELP), CITIES PAVE THE WAY: PROMISING REENTRY POLICIES THAT PROMOTE LOCAL HIRING OF
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 4–5 (2010) [hereinafter CITIES PAVE THE WAY], available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/7fcad6a8d708618e51_tcm6i6f3q.pdf. Of course, such policies still require a
criminal background check for positions where it is “necessary to ensure safety and security at the
workplace,” but instead delay the practice until an applicant has been selected for an interview or once a
conditional offer is made, much like the current policies under the ADA over which the EEOC exercises
considerable policy-shaping authority. Id. at 4; see supra note 115.
172. Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231, 250–53 (2012).
173. Harwin, supra note 41, at 16–22. Title VII’s mixed-motive framework finds discrimination
whenever an employer considers any impermissible factor when making an employment decision, even
if he would have made the same decision had he not considered that factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(2006).
174. Roberto Concepción, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks: Effectuating Disparate Impact on
Racial Minorities Under the Guise of Job-Relatedness and Business Necessity, 12 SCHOLAR 523, 546–
48 (2010); Michael C. Sturman & David Sherwyn, The Utility of Integrity Testing for Controlling
Workers’ Compensation Costs, 50 CORNELL HOSPITALITY Q. 432, 442, 444–45 (2009) (demonstrating
through prior research and current testing of 29,043 applicants at hotel company that integrity tests (1)
can predict outcomes of importance to organizations, (2) elicit responses from applicants that screen
potentially high-risk employees, (3) do not create disparate impact, and (4) produce returns greater than
the cost of test administration).
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hiring,175 voluntary affirmative action programs,176 and bolstering
financial incentives for private employers to create jobs for people
with criminal records177 all rely too heavily on Congress or the
courts. In light of relative congressional silence on the plight of
former offenders, the solution must be to develop an analytical
framework that promotes harmonization of the judicial and agency
approaches now inapposite—not only the divergent standards for
validation but also the purposes of the disparate impact theory—and
incorporates the logic of the Third Circuit in El, the highest court to
speak directly on the issue in at least a decade.178 In any case, the
EEOC must take the lead: make the Guidance binding, or go back to
the drawing board, providing more detail where it matters and
leaving less room for interpretation to foster predictability.
A. Putting Out Fires
1. Validation Revisited
Though the result in El may seem harsh, one of the positive
aspects of the decision was its focus on practicalities.179 The court
recognized that application of test score precedent to former
offenders challenging record-based exclusions is awkward because
“successful performance of the job” or capability in the lay sense is
not the primary issue.180 The court also made the important
distinction that Title VII does not measure care or perfection in the
formulation of hiring polices, but rather “requires that an employer
be able to show that its policy is consistent with business necessity
when challenged.”181 To reconcile the growing disconnect at these
175. See generally David Hausman, Note, How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by
Promoting Anonymous Hiring, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2012).
176. Christine Neylon O’Brien & Jonathan J. Darrow, Adverse Employment Consequences Triggered
by Criminal Convictions: Recent Cases Interpret State Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 991, 1027–28 (2007).
177. CITIES PAVE THE WAY, supra note 171, at 8 (describing supplemental tax credits that build on
the federal WOTC and bonding programs that protect employers against certain liabilities).
178. See discussion supra Parts I.B.2 & II.A.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 61–63.
180. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2007).
181. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
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distinct stages between practical evidence and business planning on
the one hand and abstract, statistics-driven Guidance policies on the
other, the content of the business necessity defense should be tied
directly to the degree of impact the plaintiff proves.182 Rather than
apply an undifferentiating mandate to engage in IA, for example, the
context of application should matter.183 Because an employer defends
on business necessity only after the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing, it makes sense that the defense should be defined, at least at
the first shift of the burden of proof, by reference to the plaintiff’s
case.184
Though this relative standard does not establish a minimum
threshold of business necessity or a bright line—something no doubt
for which the business community still yearns—it has the advantage
of minimizing judicial reexamination of hiring policies while
continuing to account for the risk of hidden discrimination, a major
concern of Congress and the Court in the Griggs era.185 Professor
George Rutherglen points out that after all, “[t]ests, qualifications,
and selection procedures with little adverse impact are likely neither
to serve as pretexts for discrimination nor to deny equality of
opportunity. Employment practices with great adverse impact are
likely to do both.”186 The latter is where the EEOC should intensify
its focus. Using a sliding scale tied to litigation realities, overbroad,
merely general, unsophisticated, or bare common sense assertions
still will not likely be enough for an employer to prevail in defense
against even mild adverse impact, but perhaps requiring that
employers create narrowly tailored position-specific policies on the
basis of research of indeterminate reliability will not be necessary
either.187 Despite modern advances in technology and heightened
182. Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1320.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1320, 1323.
185. Id. at 1303–09, 1320–21.
186. Id. at 1324.
187. In El, for example, Dr. Alfred Blumstein, an authority on recidivism, all but conceded that the
criminology discipline is incapable of distinguishing accurately between categories of offenders. El v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2007). An individual’s propensity to
commit a future violent act generally decreases as that individual’s crime-free duration increases, but
“‘making . . . predictions of comparable low-probability events is extremely difficult, and . . .
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interest in criminal justice reform, studies linking prior criminal
behavior to future work-related aptitudes are not abundant, if existent
at all.188 Therefore, rigidly adhering to the Uniform Guidelines’
approach—apt for addressing tests that produce raw scores and
quantifiable data—is not fitting for this novel form of discrimination
attuned to risk rather than ability.189
2. Clarifying the Goal
“Disputes over discrimination are the flip side of disputes over
equality: discrimination identifies what is prohibited; equality is
what should be achieved.”190
When the Court decided Griggs in 1971, it likely did not foresee
that Title VII’s remedial and prospective equality goals would ever
come into conflict.191 The leading gloss on Griggs informs that the
most compelling goal of disparate impact theory is to prevent
pretextual discrimination by institutional defendants.192 By contrast,
the EEOC’s goal seems clear—achieve economic equality for former
offenders, and to a lesser degree, require that employers make
decisions on merit alone.193 Accordingly, the implementation of the
[criminology] provides no good basis for [doing so].’” Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
188. 2012 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 15.
189. For a brief discussion of the Tower Amendment’s express authorization of an employer’s use of
professionally developed ability tests, see discussion supra note 159 and 110 Cong. Rec. 13492–503
(1964). The better way to address record-based exclusions and risk is perhaps through focusing on
practical significance, which finds some support in § 4(D) of the Uniform Guidelines. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4 (2013) (recognizing smaller or greater differences in selection rate are not determinative, but
rather depend on an employer’s actions or reputation, small sample size, atypical recruiting programs,
and duration of proper recordkeeping).
190. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 15, at 14.
191. See discussion supra Part II.A.
192. Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1309–11; David A. Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 1014 (1989). Rutherglen
argues that “[i]n hindsight, Griggs appears to be a case of obvious pretextual discrimination, which
could equally well have been . . . [decided on the basis] of disparate treatment.” Rutherglen, Disparate
Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1331; see supra text accompanying note 110. The Griggs Court merely
devised a novel way to avoid wading through the intent of the institutional agents—whose intent may
conflict, whose authority may overlap, and whose actions may deviate from official policy. Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1309–10.
193. Though decisions based solely on job performance may achieve the equality sought by the
EEOC, relying on merit alone would be a “grossly simplified . . . and [an] inaccurate description of

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss2/6

40

Nichols: Where There's Smoke, There's Fire?: The Cloud of Suspicion Surrou

2014]

THE EEOC'S NEW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE

631

Uniform Guidelines and development of successive enforcement
guidances have rendered employment practices increasingly difficult
to justify and the defendant’s burden correspondingly difficult to
carry at the agency level.194 Unfortunately, the EEOC and the federal
courts are hopelessly star-crossed, each with distinct responsibilities
to carry out the promise of Title VII.195
Further clarifying the burden of justification for the business
necessity defense in light of these competing goals would have
advantages beyond merely simplifying an employer’s case. As it
stands under the Guidance, requiring a complete record of multi-step
IA and expertly crafted “targeted screens” formulated on the basis of
sociological research only “exaggerat[es] the . . . tendency of the
adversary system to generate ever more sophisticated forms of
evidence.”196 As Part II.A suggests, these stringent proof
requirements stand to serve the independent purpose of eliminating
systematic disadvantages in addition to merely enforcing what is
required by law, a view consistent with the EEOC’s vocal wish to
correct social injustices facing former offenders through the vehicle
of employment.197 However, the proof race likewise affects
plaintiffs.198 First, weak evidence of disparate impact—like simplistic
employment discrimination law” and of the Guidance’s policies also. William R. Corbett, The Ugly
Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our Employment Discrimination Law, 14
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153, 159 (2007). Because Title VII does not protect former offender
status, the Guidance necessitates that an applicant challenging a criminal record exclusion be part of a
protected racial or ethnic class, inherently disproving any assertion of “colorblindness.” 2012
GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 6.
194. Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1314; see discussion and accompanying
notes supra Part I.C.2 and note 91.
195. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 380–433 (2010); see also supra
note 14. Adding to the tension is the fact that disparate impact theory was a creation of federal common
law, and individual Justices themselves have played active roles in shaping antidiscrimination law
generally. It was during Justice Clarence Thomas’s eight-year chairmanship of the EEOC that the
Commission first issued guidance addressing conviction records. 2011 Meeting Transcript, supra note
78, at 3. Prior to joining the Court, Justice Ginsburg litigated several landmark sex discrimination cases
that led to the development and application of intermediate scrutiny to legal classifications based on sex.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
196. Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1330.
197. 2012 Meeting Transcript, supra note 79, at 5. After all, unemployment is not supposed to be part
of the punishment for criminal conduct. Aukerman, supra note 21, at 22.
198. Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1329–30. If defendants had some
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use of national arrest rates—leads the court to impose a weak
requirement of business justification.199 Second, when employers
face a significantly lower bar of justification, the agency risks a
second significant moral loss: apathetic business and legal
communities—“It’s just the EEOC.” To avoid these outcomes and to
better serve its ends, the EEOC should subordinate its goal of
equality to a significant, but manageable, view of business
justification as gleaned from the courts.200
A recent example illustrates the frailties of the EEOC’s approach.
The agency announced in January 2012 that it reached a $3.13
million dollar conciliation settlement with PepsiCo for that
company’s alleged use of an infirm criminal background check
policy.201 Though not a menial sum, PepsiCo earned over $34.9
billon dollars in gross profit in 2011.202 Though the settlement “sent a
message” relative to the EEOC’s enforcement focus in this area, it is
difficult to classify it as a meaningful victory when disbursed
amongst at least 300 applicants and at best only pinching PepsiCo’s
realistic prospect of justifying their business practices, there would be no need to force plaintiffs to
prove something tantamount to intentional discrimination through increasingly complex statistical
evidence. Id.
199. See Roby v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 775 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding railroad met its
burden by showing only “the rules examination is critical to . . . safe operation[s]” where the evidence of
adverse impact was “scant”); Merwine v. Bd. of Trs. for State Insts. of Higher Learning, 754 F.2d 631,
634, 639 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that even if plaintiff’s statistical evidence, pulled from a narrow
applicant pool for the professional librarian position at Mississippi State University, made out a prima
facie case, the degree requirement was justified); Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60,
at 1321.
200. The EEOC’s core mission is to “‘stop and remedy unlawful employment discrimination,’” while
“‘justice and equality in the workplace’” is the long term “vision.” STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 132, at
3. Of course, these two ideals are inextricably related because eliminating discrimination is one way of
achieving greater representation of disadvantaged groups in the work force, but the Guidance’s standard
of justification and the tone of recent Commission meetings indicate the latter goal seems to lead the
former. See supra note 125.
201. Press Release, U.S. EEOC, Pepsi to Pay $3.13 Million and Made Major Policy Changes to
Resolve EEOC Finding of Nationwide Hiring Discrimination Against African Americans (Jan. 11,
2012) [hereinafter Pepsi Press Release], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-1112a.cfm. The EEOC and PepsiCo mutually agreed to publicize the settlement (normally confidential).
Press Release, Nat’l Reentry Res. Ctr., In Settlement, EEOC Clarifies Law on Employer’s Use of Arrest
and Conviction Records in Hiring Process (Jan. 31, 2012) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review). More important than the dollar amount, PepsiCo must provide the EEOC with regular
reports on its hiring practices and offer training to its hiring personnel and managers under the
settlement. Pepsi Press Release, supra.
202. PepsiCo, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 121 (Feb. 27, 2012).
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purse to the tune of 0.0005% of its net income.203 This result hardly
seems to evince the desired deterrent effect of the strategic plan and
belies the EEOC’s reach in attaining widespread equality through the
conciliation process.204 Smoking out discrimination by volume—
getting more former offenders in the door and at the conciliation
table because the initial bar is sufficiently low—has value in
encouraging a politically powerless population to vindicate its rights
and participate in the legal process, but it is also patently
inefficient.205
In the absence of action to make the Guidance binding law, the
EEOC needs a victory in federal court to positively impact its
vision.206 As it stands now, utilizing the Guidance’s stringent, broad,
and judicially-insulated requirements to garner arguably small
victories at the agency level will not achieve equal opportunity on the
scale contemplated or needed to serve the exploding reentering
offender population.207 The EEOC’s goal of racial balance—more
precisely former offender equality—need not be entirely disavowed,
but it must be qualified to reflect that the first issue of proving impact
is crucial. The further the agency moves away from
203. PepsiCo earned $6.443 billion in net income in 2011 after the payment of costs, taxes, and
interest expense. Id. The $3.13 million settlement thus represents 0.000486% of that amount.
204. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 132, at 15 (“Strategy I.B.1: Ensure that remedies end
discriminatory practices and deter future discrimination . . . .”).
205. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 12–15, 52–53 (1996) (using empirical analysis to compare the
agency’s work to parallel enforcement by private attorneys). The EEOC has not published statistics
reflecting Title VII charge receipts specifically alleging disparate impact on the basis of criminal record
exclusions, but the volume of claims the agency handles is “substantial and increasing.” TITLE VII
STATS, supra note 130; Selmi, supra, at 12. Strikingly few claims, however, are settled favorably for
plaintiffs, and “the vast majority of claims are effectively dismissed.” Selmi, supra, at 1 n.3, 25.
206. Extensive examination of legislative history reflects that because Congress chose to rely upon
judicial enforcement if administrative conciliation failed, it left application and interpretation of Title
VII—including the precise definition of business necessity—largely to the federal courts. Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1307; Spiropoulos, supra note 100, at 1523; see also supra
note 133 and accompanying text. For detailed accounts of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the EEO Act of 1972, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, respectively, see George Rutherglen,
Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 690–96, 713–20 (1980) and Spiropoulos, supra note
100, at 1504–21.
207. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010 5 (2011). In 2010 alone,
708,677 individuals were released from state and federal prison. Id. Despite the magnitude of this issue,
Professor Andrew C. Spiropoulos argues that attacking isolated practices with mild impact may
cumulatively have a great effect. Spiropoulos, supra note 100, at 1556.

Published by Reading Room, 2013

43

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 6

634

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

antidiscrimination law’s original purpose to prevent intentional
adverse employment actions, including the subtlest forms of such
intent, the more it risks skepticism and running into chance.208 First
strengthening its plaintiffs’ cases, and tempering the prescription of
IAs, promises a more effective long-term litigation strategy.209
B. When the Smoke Clears: The Opportunity for Advocacy
As a nation and an economy, we value consistency and
predictability in the law, especially in the area of employment
discrimination—a “very personal, sensitive, and socially important
area.”210 If, as suggested in Part III.A, the EEOC elects not to
reevaluate and modify the balance of burdens to reflect the reality
that it is not the only player in the enforcement game, any further
efforts to “firmly suggest” accommodation through IA in the hiring
process must go through proper rulemaking procedures, or in the
alternative, legislative channels.211 Appropriate laws can and should
correct this failure and that of the market, encouraging rehabilitation
and reintegration through employment, while at the same time
providing sensible limits to promote business development and
assuage safety concerns.212

208. See Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Theory, supra note 60, at 1323–24 (explaining that the
Supreme Court requires plaintiffs to establish substantial disparate impact to approximate intent, not just
any “slight” difference in treatment, because such a difference “may still be so small that it is not
practically significant from an economic, managerial, or legal point of view”).
209. See supra note 206. Such an approach will hopefully garner greater respect from the federal
courts and more willingness on the part of employers to respond with socially conscious hiring policies
when their flexibility in carrying out everyday personnel matters is not meticulously constrained by an
onerous burden of detached statistics.
210. Hoffman, supra note 150, at 1545.
211. 2012 Meeting Transcript, supra note 79, at 7 (noting that ranking congressional members
expressed concern about the haste with which the Guidance was amended and specifically instructed
that the Commission circulate any proposed changes to the public for six months before commencing a
vote, presumably in conformity with notice and comment). As mentioned previously in note 123, more
controversial is the fact that Title VII has an explicit prohibition against preferential treatment, or
affirmative action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006). Whether IA constitutes preferential treatment or
whether the Guidance as a whole intends such a result for former offenders is beyond the scope of this
Note.
212. See O’Brien & Darrow, supra note 176, at 1025–27 (analyzing the advantages of state-enacted
protections and discussing new federal legislation, recommended and already proposed).
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Congressional silence, however, is not surprising. It takes political
clout to affect change. Former offenders lack the necessary political
support, organization, or lobbying strength, especially considering
they comprise a fairly non-homogenous and “invisible” group.213
What’s more, congressional paralysis on any number of arguably
more important issues—like deficit reduction or the instability of the
Social Security system, among others—does not bode well for
legislative efforts to protect and uplift this population.214 Perhaps
then the rationale of shifting the costs of procedural injustice to
employers who have the ability to lobby makes sense from the
standpoint of tort law—private employers represent the “cheapest
cost avoider” or the party most able to bear the burden of the
Guidance’s policies.215 Applying this theory, however, fails as a
means for change. With the odds concertedly in employers’ favor, it
is more likely that large companies—or at least their lawyers—will
chalk up the risk of agency action or litigation to a cost of doing
business rather than seek the benefits of clarification that a run on
Capitol Hill could bring to all parties involved, including the
EEOC.216

213. Aukerman, supra note 21, at 64–65 (“[I]t is fairly simple to distinguish between those people
who have never been convicted and those who have . . . . However, . . . [t]he contents and consequences
of those records vary tremendously. . . . [T]he primary characteristics that make people with criminal
records like a suspect class[—]the history of discrimination against and the political weakness of this
group[—]do not apply with equal force to all [class] members.”).
214. For example, see the discussion of the Second Chance Act’s stalled reauthorization, supra note
80.
215. Strauss, supra note 192, at 1013 (“Griggs identifies those cases in which making a mistake will
impose the least cost on the employer. In view of the danger of discrimination that arises whenever an
employer uses a criterion with a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected group, it is reasonable to
require the employer . . . to take the relatively inexpensive step of abandoning it.”).
216. Even if a plaintiff wins on the merits in a disparate impact case, no punitive or compensatory
damages will be assessed against an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1); see also Elaine W. Shoben,
Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good for? What Not?, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598 (2004).
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CONCLUSION
“[S]ociety’s attitude toward [policies uplifting] those with
criminal records is comparable to its attitude toward power plants,
power lines, highways, and reservoirs: it is generally agreed that
these structures are necessary and beneficial to modern society, but
no one wants them to be located on or near their property.”217
Legal precedent218 and common sense dictate that a criminal
record can be a blunt, misleading tool to determine whether an
applicant poses a “risk” of incompetence, lack of diligence, or
violence on the job. However, the reality is that “employers do not
[and will not] go out of their way to solicit nuanced information
about applicants for entry-level [positions]” as the Guidance urges.219
More impractical yet is the EEOC’s claim that the Guidance
represents no change in policy even though it significantly increases
employer burdens while requiring only minimal, if any, proof of
disparate impact.220 To bring about meaningful change for those
African-American and Hispanic men impacted by increasingly
common record-based exclusions, the EEOC has two choices moving
forward: reevaluate its core mission and improve the Guidance’s
workability by incorporating the prevailing standards in the federal
courts, or in the absence of temperance, fortify its current position

217. See O’Brien & Darrow, supra note 176, at 1028.
218. See, e.g., discussion supra accompanying notes 40 (Litton), 45 (Green v. MoPac), and 140–141
(Schware).
219. Pager, supra note 6, at 954. An employer’s return on investment of time and money to do so is
likely to be, or perceived to be, in the red. Id.; see supra note 83.
220. See, e.g., 2012 Meeting Transcript, supra note 79, at 6 (statement of Commissioner Ishimaru)
(“[T]hroughout the 25 years that this [policy] has been here at this Agency, our analysis . . . has been
consistent and today we refine, and update, and develop it. . . . The document . . . is not radical, it’s not
new, but it is necessary.”). By contrast, defending her lone dissenting vote, Commissioner Barker
asserted:
The proposed revision . . . represents a major shift in the advice we have given the
American public for the last 22 years. Yet, we are about to approve this dramatic shift in
our interpretation of the . . . obligations of America’s businesses under Title VII without
ever circulating it to the American public.
Id. at 7; see also supra note 81 detailing plaintiffs’ burden of proving adverse impact in agency actions.
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through notice and comment.221 Unfortunately, these are not easy or
politically popular solutions.
Abolishing discrimination based on race or ethnicity—or even the
status of having the mark of a criminal record—is an important
societal goal, but an equally legitimate goal is respecting employers’
autonomy.222 Our nation deeply values free market principles and
entrepreneurial decision-making appropriate and necessary to
generate profits, jobs, and other less tangible contributions to the
economy, especially in the wake of one of the most devastating
recessions in decades.223 Achieving the “right” cost-benefit balance
for all stakeholders is a thorny endeavor for an executive branch
agency. While the Guidance and the Individualized Assessment
method are certainly optimistic institutional and political responses to
a vexing set of social and economic problems, they likely represent
only the beginning of new uncertainty in employment discrimination
law, and initiatives at other forms of compromise, but, ironically, not
litigation.

221. It is important to understand that the Guidance’s rigid necessity standard is unworkable not
because it is unfair, impractical to require scientific validation when there is mild disparate impact, or
because it is perceived as expensive. Spiropoulos, supra note 100, at 1543, 1554–56. Aside from the
procedural fairness considerations under the APA, the Guidance fails because it requires scientific
validation at the policy formulation stage when such validation, even today, is generally impossible. Id.
at 1555; see also supra note 187 and text accompanying note 85.
222. Corbett, supra note 193, at 166 (“Perhaps the starkest example of . . . respect for employer
prerogatives is the much-maligned employment-at-will ‘doctrine,’ which provides that employers can
terminate employees for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.”); see also Payne v. W. & Atl.
R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“All may dismiss their employes [sic] at will, be they many or
few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal
wrong.”), overruled in part by Hutton v. Waters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see generally Clyde W.
Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 65, 85 (2000). Is hiring merely the flip side of the termination coin?
223. Corbett, supra note 193, at 166. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, SPOTLIGHT ON
STATISTICS: THE RECESSION OF 2007–2009 7 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/
recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf; Richard Pérez-Peña, Job Losses Persist for the LessEducated, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/us/job-losses-persist-forthe-less-educated.html.
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